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“Do-Not-Track” as Contract
Joshua A.T. Fairfield*
Individual liberty is individual power, and as the power of
a community is a mass compounded of individual powers,
the nation which enjoys the most freedom must
necessarily be in proportion to its numbers the most
powerful nation.
-John Quincy Adams, Letter to James Lloyd
October 1, 18221

ABSTRACT
Support for enforcement of a do-not-track option in browsers
has been gathering steam. Such an option presents a simple method for
consumers to protect their privacy. The problem is how to enforce this
choice. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could enforce a
do-not-track option in a consumer browser under its section 5 powers.
The FTC, however, currently appears to lack the political will to do so.
Moreover, the FTC cannot follow the model of its successful do-not-call
list since the majority of Internet service providers (ISPs) assign
Internet addresses dynamically—telephone numbers do not change,
whereas Internet protocol (IP) addresses may vary.
This Article explores whether, as a matter of contract law, a
browser do-not-track option is enforceable against a corporation, and
concludes that it is. The emerging standard of online consent has been
whether a party proceeds with a transaction after the counterparty
informs the party of the terms of the contract. Adhesion contracts in
electronic contexts have bound consumers for over a quarter century in
precisely this manner.
This Article argues that what applies to consumers should
apply to corporations. When a consumer expresses her preference, in the
very first exchange between the consumer and corporate computers, for
the corporation not to track her information, the company is free to
refuse the transaction if it does not wish to continue on the consumer’s
terms. This Article therefore proceeds in three broad parts. Part I
© 2012 Joshua A.T. Fairfield. The Author is an Associate Professor of Law and
1.
See Daniel W. Sutherland, Homeland Security and Civil Liberties: Preserving
America’s Way of Life, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 289, 302 n.39 (2005).
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introduces the current methods of corporate surveillance of consumers,
which have reached dizzying heights. Part II discusses the law of
e-commercial and mass-market contracts, which courts have held to
bind consumers even on the merest fig leaf of a legal theory of consent.
Part III proposes a solution: the answer is not to continue making
consumers read more privacy policies on various websites, but instead
to enforce the simple preferences that the consumer expresses once.
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This Article asks whether, as a matter of contract law, a court
can enforce against a corporation a do-not-track option selected in a
consumer’s browser.2 Currently, this approach is under theorized in
the legal literature.3 This Article concludes that courts can enforce
2.
For purposes of this Article, tracking is the identification, storage, and analysis of
who you are, where you are, and what you do online. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove,
The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1814, 1845 (2011) (discussing tracking online in the context of personally identifiable
information).
3.
See Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 17-27 (2011) (outlining the problems of behavioral
advertising on consumer privacy and the needed regime of broad mandatory regulation combined
with an audit requirement to address the root causes of the potential harm); Julie Brill, The
Intersection of Consumer Protection and Competition in the New World of Privacy, 7
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 7, 7 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/110519CPI.
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consumer privacy preferences using fairly mundane contract law
principles,4 and more importantly, concludes that courts should
enforce consumer preferences, since this is an important method of
returning control over private information to citizens.5 This Article
pdf (explaining how the FTC might balance consumer protection concerns, such as do-not-track
arising in the context of privacy, with competition issues); Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as
Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1650 (2011) (discussing the role of website design in
contracting online and how it should be part of an online agreement when it is incorporated into
or consistent with the terms of use); Matthew S. Kirsch, Note, Do-Not-Track: Revising the EU’s
Data Protection Framework to Require Meaningful Consent for Behavioral Advertising, 18 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2, 54-74 (2011) (discussing the upcoming revision of the European Union’s Data
Protection Directive and how it should require advertisers to use and respect a do-not-track
mechanism for consumers to meaningfully consent, or not, to online tracking for use in
behavioral advertising); Tracy A. Steindel, Note, A Path Toward User Control of Online
Profiling, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 459, 466-84 (2011) (discussing the problem of
online tracking for consumers and the problems that can arise, and how a do-not-track browser
option should be implemented in federal legislation to protect consumers).
Adoption of online privacy policies could facilitate a market-based licensing approach
to personal data protection. When Web sites post notices saying personal data will not
be collected, disclosed, or used except for named purposes, users who supply data in
reliance on those restrictions may be able to enforce the restrictions. A market-based
licensing approach may also arise if technology evolves to allow ‘negotiated’
agreements on the collection, use, or disclosures of personal data.
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2000).
4.
See discussion infra Part III.B. This discussion highlights an important distinction
with the literature above. This Article argues for a simple and unitary do-not-track option that
courts can enforce as a matter of contract law. The options presented rely on federal legislation
or the FTC directly. Federal legislation may be watered down in order to balance competing
interests, and the FTC does not seem willing as of yet to move forward, an option it is
considering is a repeat of a prior failed effort. See Declan McCullagh, FTC Official: Do Not Count
on Do Not Track Just Yet, CNET NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/830131921_3-20123158-281/ftc-official-do-not-count-on-do-not-track-just-yet (discussing different
approaches by two different FTC commissioners and that there is no time table for any
immediate action); see also FTC Says Significant Steps Made For DNT—Still Work To Be Done,
FUTURE PRIVACY FORUM, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2011/10/18/ftc-says-significant-stepsmade-for-dnt-still-work-to-be-done (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter FTC Significant
Steps] (“FTC Commissioner Julie Brill spoke at the Online Trust Alliance (OTA) Forum today
and noted . . . . ‘I don’t see this as a toggle switch-on or off,’ but rather ‘a place where consumers
can choose through a dashboard mechanism what they want . . . .’ She further stated that the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Tracking Protection Working Group is working around
issues like ‘what does tracking mean’ and other technical issues.”).
5.
Courts do not currently enforce consumer preferences because the balance of favor is
in corporate hands with technological solutions. See Emily Steel, FTC’s Proposed Changes to Web
Privacy Rules Give Parents More Control, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424053111903927204576573021939728718.html (“‘The Internet revolution
makes snapshot photography and wiretap technology look like child’s play,’ FTC Commissioner
Julie Brill said . . . . As proof that the use of consumer data is wading into dangerous territory,
Ms. Brill cited a 2010 story from the Wall Street Journal’s ‘What They Know’ series on online
privacy issues about a life insurer that used tracking data about consumers to help determine
their life expectancy, rates and insurance coverage.”); see also Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani
Kane, Your Apps are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704694004576020083703574602.html (“An examination of 101 popular
smartphone ‘apps’ . . . . reveal the intrusive effort by online-tracking companies to gather
personal data . . . . Smartphone users are all but powerless to limit the tracking. With few
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also asks the deeper question of whether courts can succeed in
protecting consumers solely by construing corporate-drafted contract
terms. The Article argues that they cannot: a corporate-drafted
contract will still favor the corporation on balance,6 no matter what
tools of interpretation or equity a court brings to bear.7 On the
contrary, the modern tools of automated contract formation should be
available to the consumer and corporation alike. Courts therefore can
and should enforce consumer-offered contract terms—such as the
preference not to be tracked—as part of a broader effort8 to restore
balance to online contract law and the consumer information market.
Corporations constantly track US consumers.9 This consistent
and pervasive surveillance means that consumers are easily tracked
exceptions, app users can’t ‘opt out’ of phone tracking . . . .”). Cookies are small pieces of code
installed on a user’s computer or smartphone that allow third parties to identify a computer so
that they can save information, such as a password or login name, or track user information. See
Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and
Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271 (2008) (detailing what cookies are and
how they work).
6.
See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny
of Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95, 101-05 (2006) (discussing how dominance of the
drafter has become typical in contract law and mentioning certain defenses such as
unconscionability or duress as potential defenses to abiding by standardized form contracts that
are simply accepted by consumers without negotiation); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) (“Today, by contrast, more and more courts and commentators seem
willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a document and calls it a contract, courts will
enforce it as a contract even if no one agrees to it.”).
7.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A vendor, as master
of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of
conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor
proposes to treat as acceptance.”); Fisher v. MediSense, Inc., No. 95-1004-PFK, 1995 WL 396613,
at *6 (D. Kan. June 29, 1995) (“Undue influence is not proven, nor is a contract unconscionable,
merely because a corporation drafts a contract.”); see also Knapp, supra note 6.
8.
Compare Susuk Lim, Litigation, Death of the Spam Wrangler: CAN-SPAM Private
Plaintiffs Required to Show Actual Harm, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 155, 167 (2010) (“One of
CAN-SPAM’s stated aims is to address the states’ disparate standards for commercial e-mail,
which it found to be incompatible with the geographically independent nature of e-mail.”), with
Marc Lifsher & Jessica Guynn, Online ‘Do Not Track’ Bill Introduced in California Senate, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/06/business/la-fi-do-not-track-20110406
(“[P]roponents of do-not-track laws point to California’s 2002 passage of a do-not-call
telemarketing bill as a precedent. However, the California law never took effect because the
federal government issued its own do-not-call regulations in mid-2003.”), and S.B. 761,
2011-2012 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (“This bill would require the Attorney General, by July 1,
2012, to adopt regulations that would require online businesses to provide California consumers
with a method for the consumer to opt out of the collection or use of his or her information by the
business.”).
9.
See Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons
Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 1, 11 (2009) (“Although behavioral tracking has typically been reported to be anonymous,
there are indications that information collected online is being combined with data collected
offline.”); see also James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78
WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (“Americans have only the vaguest idea how much of their lives is
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everywhere they go, even as they move from one website to another.10
Consumers are even tracked offline.11 Because cell phones are
miniature Global Positioning System (GPS)-enabled tracking
devices,12 corporations can often gain detailed pictures of where
consumers go in real space and can correlate that information with
consumers’ online behaviors.13 In short, there is no longer any place to
hide, online or off. A number of different companies—ranging from
Google to Internet service providers (ISPs) to smartphone application
providers to data brokers and marketers—gather, index, sell, and
resell all of American consumers’ data.14
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has suggested a
do-not-track list that would follow the model of the successful federal
do-not-call list.15 This list would be an important step forward in
permitting consumers simple, unitary, and default controls over their
personal privacy.
Several bills are before Congress concerning
recoded in databases . . . . the widespread and fast-growing data aggregation industry, and the
harm that can result from information collection and sharing.”).
10.
Nehf, supra note 9, at 20 (“When a user explores a site, the user leaves electronic
footprints behind. By following the footprints, the site can record information about the user . . . .
The site can also record . . . the website previously visited . . . .”).
11.
See Gindin, supra note 9; see also Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report; Critics Press
Legal Assault on Tracking of Web Users, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, http://www.nytimes.
com/2000/02/07/business/e-commerce-report-critics-press-legal-assault-on-tracking-of-web-users.
html (“DoubleClick . . . has begun adding information about consumers’ offline behavior to its
huge database. . . . DoubleClick . . . has [also] begun combining its online data with information
gleaned from consumers offline purchases from major retailers, catalog companies and
publishers.”).
12.
See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 713 (2011) (“Increasingly, smart phones come
equipped with GPS locators . . . . Even traditional cell phones, without Internet capabilities, now
include GPS technology so that providers may comply with federal regulations requiring them to
pinpoint locations during emergency calls.”).
13.
See Nehf, supra note 9, at 20 (“Many websites secretly track a customer’s surfing
practices through the use of ‘cookies’ and similar technologies.”); see also Tedeschi, supra note 11.
14.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 362 (“Acxiom, is ‘a billion-dollar player in the data industry
. . . .’ [and] provides information to marketers for profiling consumers, manages credit records,
sells data for background checks, and provides data to government agencies . . . .”); Thurm &
Kane, supra note 5 (discussing mobile app tracking); Advertising and Privacy, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/privacy/ads (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (“To serve ads in applications and
other clients where cookie technology is not available, we have engineered an anonymous ID by
associating your device ID with a random, anonymous string of characters. You may choose to
reset or opt out of anonymous IDs at any time. . . . The ads that appear with search results on
Google can be personalized based on your Google Account or customized for your web browser.
Using previous queries and Web History can help us provide more relevant ads to you.”).
15.
See FTC Testifies on Do Not Track Legislation, FTC (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.ftc.
gov/opa/2010/12/dnttestimony.shtm. This was done at the urging of Congress. See Do-Not-Track
Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011) (“To require the Federal Trade Commission to
prescribe regulations regarding the collection and use of personal information obtained by
tracking the online activity of an individual, and for other purposes.”).
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do-not-track efforts and data privacy.16 However, these bills are not
focused on a unitary do-not-track option enforceable by the consumer
herself. There is promise in the proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights (CPBOR) by the White House, which suggests that consumers
should have the option to withdraw their information from use by
corporations.17 The focus of the CPBOR is on collaboration between
consumers, corporations, and other stakeholders.
The CPBOR
suggests new legislation, or new industry codes of conduct.18
Government-brokered industry self regulation will almost inevitably
yield the same results that industry self regulation has produced to
date—consumers bear all the cost of protecting their privacy. This
Article outlines how contract law might provide relief for consumers
who seek to protect their data.19
This Article notes one problem of terminology that is both
important to clarify and revelatory of the problem. When one says
“corporate contracts,” it is clear that the contract is offered by and
entered into by a corporation. But when one says “consumer
contracts” in this field of academic inquiry, it almost never means
“contracts written by consumers,” but instead means only those
entered into by consumers.20 As most often used in the contracting
literature, “consumer contracts” actually means the same thing as
“corporate contracts.”
This usage reveals the basic problem:
consumers under modern contracting regimes generally cannot offer
their own terms and expect courts to enforce them. This Article seeks

16.
See, e.g., S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 653, 112th
Cong. (2011); H.R. 611, 112th Cong. (2011).
17.
See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, We Can’t Wait:
Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill Of Rights” to Protect Consumers
Online (Feb 23, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-waitobama-administration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights (“The blueprint will guide efforts to
give users more control over how their personal information is used on the Internet and to help
businesses maintain consumer trust and grow in the rapidly changing digital environment. At
the request of the White House, the Commerce Department will begin convening companies,
privacy advocates and other stakeholders to develop and implement enforceable privacy policies
based on the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING
INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 11 (2012) (hereinafter CPBOR), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
(“Companies
should
offer
consumers means to withdraw or limit consent that are as accessible and easily used as the
methods for granting consent in the first place.”). The proposal does not elaborate further on
what tools consumers can use to withdraw or stop the use of their information. See id. The
problem with this current language is that it assumes that consumers’ data has already been
collected, a point this Article hopes to address by preventing data collection in the first place.
18.
CPBOR, supra note 17.
19.
See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing a do-not-track browser option).
20.
See Knapp, supra note 6, at 98; Lemley, supra note 6, at 462.
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to reverse that trend.21 Therefore, when this Article uses the term
“consumer contract,” it means a contract offered by a consumer,
usually through a software intermediary, and accepted by the
corporation.
In examining the question of whether a consumer can expect a
court to enforce her contractual preference against tracking, this
Article begins with the somewhat sorry state of the law regarding
mass-market corporate contracts targeted at consumers.
After
reviewing some of the relevant legal trends, this Article asserts that,
since corporations have been busy binding consumers to standardized
take-it-or-leave-it contracts since the advent of the Internet,22 courts
should take seriously the possibility that consumers can do the same
to corporations. The Article goes on to propose that the power to
determine terms in basic contracts has been taken away from
consumers, that it can be quickly and easily given back, and that
doing so addresses the heart of the current problem—the lack of power
that consumers have to determine the contractual terms governing the
sale or use of their data.23 In short, this Article argues that what is
good for the corporate goose is good for the consumer gander.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the
mechanics of online tracking and corporate surveillance of consumers.
Part II considers the legal literature and law of mass-market
consumer contracting. Part III offers a straightforward solution: that
courts accept and enforce consumer-offered standardized agreements
on the same terms as corporate-offered agreements.
I. ONLINE CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE
Corporate surveillance of consumers has now achieved such
low costs as to be truly ubiquitous.24 The exhaustive nature of this

21.
See sources cited supra note 20; see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a
Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 678 (2007) (addressing the lack of consumer choice in accepting
boilerplate language in standard form contracts).
22.
See Lemley, supra note 6, at 465-66.
23.
See discussion infra Part II (discussing online contracting).
24.
See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney
and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2011) (“The online
tracking industry is growing, inspired by decreasing costs of technology along with largely
unregulated access to a vast amount of information sent online.” (footnotes omitted)); Jonathan
Zittrain, Law in a Networked World: Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 80 n.58 (discussing
the use of cheap sensors and networks by corporate entities to create “digital dossiers”); see also
Julia Angwin, Tracking the Companies that Track You Online, NPR (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129298003 (“[N]early all of the most
commonly visited websites gather information in real time about the behavior of online users. . . .
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section is necessitated by the extreme nature of the technology
involved.
It is worth exploring how pervasive and ubiquitous
surveillance of consumers has become, so that one can understand the
need for the legal reform proposals detailed further on.
In the US scheme of consumer data gathering, there are
multiple levels of surveillance,25 with the primary goal of behavioral
advertising—tailoring online advertisements to the individual.26 Even
if a consumer tried to take reasonable measures to avoid being
tracked, she would find the process nearly impossible.27 This difficulty
is due, in part, to the varied tracking methods that companies have at
their disposal.28
The present analysis begins with a simple premise: law is often
necessary to solve technological problems by stopping technological
arms races.29 This premise runs contrary to a popular view of the
[There are] more than 100 tracking companies, data brokers and advertising networks collecting
data — which are then sold on a stock market-like exchange to online advertisers.”).
25.
See Louise Story, How Do They Track You? Let Us Count the Ways, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2008, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/how-do-they-track-you-let-us-count-theways (“The . . . study tallied five types of ‘data collection events’ on the Internet for 15 large
media companies[:] . . . [p]ages displayed, search queries entered, videos played, . . . advertising
displayed . . . . [and] ads served on pages anywhere on the Web by advertising networks owned
by the media companies. . . . Typically, Web compan[ies] receive[] information about the type of
page the user is looking at, the user’s I.P. address . . . and for advertising, the content of the ad.
Most Web sites and advertising networks place cookies on users’ browsers . . . .”).
26.
See Gindin, supra note 9 ( “[T]he tracking of a consumer's online activities over
time—including the searches the consumer has conducted, the web pages visited, and the content
viewed—in order to deliver advertising targeted to the individual consumer's interests.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, Demystifying Clickstream
Data: A European and U.S. Perspective, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 563, 565-66 (2006) (“Clickstream
data is compiled from cookie based technology . . . . [and] is used in part because web server
technologies cannot store, sort, and render to a user the vast amounts of data required to deliver
the respective web solutions to each individual user to a site or to authenticate a user.”).
27.
See Riva Richmond, Resisting the Online Tracking Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/technology/personaltech/11basics.html (“Keeping your
computer free of tracking programs is not easy because of the ad industry’s aggressive and
sophisticated efforts . . . . A number of tools can minimize tracking, but using them requires
considerable effort and tech know-how.” (emphasis added)).
28.
See Gindin, supra note 9; see also Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
2d 1132, 1144-45 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (discussing tracking, in the broader context of copyright
concerns, as it relates to online user’s actual identity or their IP address); Schwartz & Solove,
supra note 2; Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14, at 362-63. But see FTC Significant Steps, supra
note 4 (“[T]he World Wide Web Consortium . . . Tracking Protection Working Group is working
around issue like ‘what does tracking mean’ . . . .”).
29.
See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1970) (“[O]ur devotion to . . . industrial competition must not force us into accepting the law of
the jungle as the standard of morality . . . . Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease
when the protections required to prevent another's spying cost so much that the spirit of
inventiveness is dampened.”); see also Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race,
81 IND. L.J. 917, 950 (2006) (“The DMCA . . . represents copyright law’s most conspicuous
institutional response to arms race phenomena.”).
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Internet, which suggests that computer code is a replacement for legal
rules online.30 This view misses the point because legal rules are most
needed when technology enables something that society deems
immoral or inefficient.31 Laws can prevent moral failures and
expensive defensive countermeasures.32 In the context of criminal
law, for example, legal prohibitions on new methods of technological
intrusion into private life are necessary to stop an arms race between
citizen and government, in which the government develops ever more
powerful tools, and citizens must take ever more elaborate and
expensive countermeasures.33 Outside of the criminal context, legal
rules operate to stop technological arms races between intellectual
property rights holders and developers of tools that can be used to
infringe those rights.34 The same analysis applies in the context of
consumer privacy: law can either give legal force to consumer privacy
preferences by permitting consumers to offer and enforce legal terms
on the Internet,35 or it can abdicate and return consumers to an ever
30.
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 5 (2006) (“Cyberspace demands a new
understanding of how regulation works. It compels us to look beyond the traditional lawyer’s
scope—beyond laws, or even norms. . . . That regulator is the obscurity in this book’s title—
Code.”). Lessig details in the preface to the second edition that the fundamental arguments in
the first edition of Code did not change in Code 2.0. Id. at ix. But see Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 680-83 (2003) (discussing how Lessig’s proposal of code replacing and
becoming law goes too far and rather that code can supplement law). This discussion details two
important points. First, the discussion is what matters because debate over the power of code
and role of law is critical to preserving an open Internet. Second, Lessig is right in that code can
be corrosive to liberty and that now the Internet is marked by control. This is not because of
consumer demand, but because corporations control code and consumers are powerless. See
LESSIG, supra note 30, at 38; discussion infra note 32.
31.
See Nick Bilton, Congress Presses Apple on App Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/congress-presses-chief-on-app-privacy; discussion infra
notes 36-39; see also duPont, 431 F.2d at 1016-17.
32.
See duPont, 431 F.2d at 1016-17; see also Scott Cleland, Why We Need A ‘DoNot-Track’ Bill, WASH. POST, May 10, 2011, http://live.washingtonpost.com/why-you-cant-trustgoogle-scott-cleland-0510.html (“People deserve the right to vote for themselves if they want to
be tracked so they can get targeted ads, or they don't want to be tracked to protect their
privacy/security and that of their family. [R]ight now people have no real choice because the
technology is way ahead of what people want and the state of the law.”); discussion infra notes
36-39.
33.
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that attachment of a GPS
unit to a car, and use of the GPS unit to track movements of the car, was a search under the
Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (holding that the
government’s use of thermal imaging technology to observe behavior inside the home constituted
a search under the Fourth Amendment); see also Stephen A. Josey, Note, Along for the Ride: GPS
and the Fourth Amendment, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 161, 170-77 (2011) (discussing United
States v. Jones and the government’s intrusion aided by technology—police use of GPS on cars to
track citizen’s movements constantly over an extended period of time).
34.
See Kovarsky, supra note 29, at 969-70.
35.
See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303,
305 n.3 (2008) (“[T]he digital environment can potentially offer a very different contractual
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more desperate technological battle to protect their privacy. This Part
discusses the mechanics of online corporate surveillance with a view
toward explaining why a legal, and not a technical, solution is
necessary.
A. The Mechanisms of Surveillance
US corporations have unfettered access to information about
every aspect of their customers’ lives.36 The original means of tracking
consumers’ online movements relied on a system of “cookies”—small
bits of code located on a consumer’s computer that would permit a
given website to track where on the site the consumer had gone.37
Corporations still use this technology, but it has largely been
outmoded38 by advertisement server tracking, which can track
consumers across the Internet without cookies through Uniform
Resource Locators (URLs), search queries, or assigned random ID
numbers to end users.39 Worse, spyware located directly on the user’s
computer or smartphone can secretly relay information to ISPs or
other online services.40
This Section begins with the most obvious threat to consumer
privacy: corporate tracking that puts software directly on the
consumer’s computer.41
It then proceeds outwards, from the
setting, providing consumers with an ‘electronic butler’ that will automatically signal the
consumers’ contractual preferences to the various vendors.”).
36.
See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14 at 359 (“Currently, the collection and use of
personal data by businesses and government is spinning out of control. An entire industry
devoted primarily to processing and disseminating personal information has arisen, and this
industry is not well-regulated.”).
37.
See Rubinstein et al., supra note 5, at 271-72.
38.
See Erik Larkin, Browser Fingerprinting Can ID You Without Cookies, PCWORLD
(Jan. 29, 2010, 11:04 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/188161/browser_fingerprinting_can_id
_you_without_cookies.html (“The specific combination of mundane information such as your
plugins and system fonts can be used to create a ‘fingerprint’ for your browser that could
potentially uniquely identify you.”); see also Peter Eckersley, Help EFF Research Web Browser
Tracking, EFF (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/01/help-eff-research-webbrowser-tracking (“Traditionally, people assume they can prevent a website from identifying
them by disabling cookies on their web browser. Unfortunately, this is not the whole story.”).
39.
See Rubinstein et al., supra note 5, at 272 (“Today, concerns over cookies seem
almost quaint. . . . Recent privacy concerns now center on web services—and especially search
engines.”); see also Advertising and Privacy, supra note 14.
40.
See Ian Sherr & Anton Troianovski, Tracking-Software Maker Stirs Phone-Privacy
Fears, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020401200457
7072652397112014.html (“[S]oftware . . . from a company called Carrier IQ Inc.[,] . . . not
transparently visible to consumers, is shown tracking actions such as when buttons are pressed
and collecting personal data such as the content of text messages.”).
41.
It is useful at this point to add one major caveat. This article treats privacy through
the lens of contract law. Privacy has also been approached as a basic or a constitutional right.
See Orin S. Kerr, The Case For The Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 588 (2009). It is
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consumer’s computer to the Internet connection, to the ISP that
provides that connection, and to the servers of online service and
application providers.42
1. On the Desktop
Consumer information starts on the desktop. Everyone is
aware of cookies, but anti-cookie browsing technology does not really
protect consumer privacy. Anti-cookie technology, like the so-called
“In Private” browsing mode,43 and equivalents such as Google’s
“Incognito,”44 have been an important selling point for pure
free-market advocates. The claim is that the existence of such options
demonstrates that the market in consumer information is both
functional and respectful of consumer choices regarding privacy.45 Yet
certainly true that consumers are being tracked everywhere, that this information ends up in
unanticipated corporate and government hands without any of the constraints of the
Constitution, and that this state of affairs is corrosive to free societies. Id. But this Article is
about contract law, not constitutional law.
42.
See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14, at 359 (“Increasingly, the government is
relying on data-broker companies to supply personal data for intelligence and law enforcement
purposes. As a result, the government is navigating around the protections of the Privacy Act of
1974 . . . .”).
43.
See Edward C. Baig, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 8 Lets You Browse in Private,
USA TODAY, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwardbaig/2008-08-27Internet-explorer-8_N.htm (“With ‘InPrivate’ browsing turned on, all traces of the sites you visit
are removed from the Web history. No Web cookies . . . are left behind after you close a session.”).
But see Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Quashed Effort to Boost Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383530439838568.html
(“Explorer [requires] the consumer to turn on the feature that blocks tracking by websites, called
InPrivate Filtering. It wasn’t activated automatically. What’s more, even if consumers turn the
feature on, Microsoft designed the browser so InPrivate Filtering doesn’t stay on permanently.
Users must activate the privacy setting every time they start up the browser.”); What is
InPrivate Browsing, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-US/windows-vista/What-isInPrivate-Browsing (last visited Dec. 22, 2011) (“While you are surfing using InPrivate
Browsing, Internet Explorer stores some information—such as cookies and temporary Internet
files—so that the webpages you visit will work correctly. However, at the end of your InPrivate
Browsing session, this information is discarded.”).
44.
See Jennifer Valentino-Devries, How to Avoid Prying Eyes, WALL ST. J., July 30,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383203092034876.html (“All
major browsers offer a ‘private browsing’ mode to limit cookies. Chrome calls it ‘Incognito.’
Internet Explorer calls it ‘InPrivate Browsing,’ . . . . Private browsing doesn’t block cookies. It
deletes cookies each time you close the browser or turn off private browsing . . . .”).
45.
See Wingfield, supra note 43 (“Mr. Cullen, Microsoft’s chief Privacy strategist, says
the input of outsiders helped Microsoft strike a balance between privacy and advertising
interests. The browser, he says, ‘was a better product than when it came off the drawing-room
floor of the Internet Explorer group.’”). But see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software
Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME.
L. REV. 583, 601-02 (2006) (“People do not change defaults when they are uninformed that
another choice exists. If a person does not know about the possibility of changing an option or the
ramifications of each choice, then a default setting is equivalent to a fixed setting.” (emphasis
added)).
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such options cause consumers to erroneously believe that they are not
being tracked.46 Pure free-market advocates claim that corporations
have every bit as much of an interest in selling privacy-enhancing
products to consumers as they do in marketing surveillance products
to advertisers.47 This analysis is incomplete—the companies that
effectively defend privacy often rely on open-source code rather than
private products. Corporate “privacy tools” more often turn out to be
channels for the consumer to permit the corporation to use her data in
new ways.48 It is therefore unsurprising that emerging corporate tools
are neither simple, nor usable, nor truly effective.49
A closer look at current technology may help to illustrate why
it is so difficult for consumers to engage in privacy self-help with
currently available anti-surveillance products. To access a website, a
user requests a URL—the string of characters in the address field that
identifies and locates the website.50 The website can compose a
unique URL on the fly, which acts as a server-side digital footprint
that tracks the user’s activity. The URL can change depending on
what the user clicks on, such as a banner advertisement or hyperlink
to a related topic. Therefore, someone who has access to the user’s
viewing history, such as an ISP,51 can track her movements by

46.
See Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Proprietary of
Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2006)
(“Eventually, advertisers sought to overcome the domain-specific limitations of cookies and
instead develop a means by which they could follow consumers wherever they went on the
Internet. Thus, the concept of spyware was born.”); Kesan & Shah, supra note 45.
47.
See Consumers are Key to Privacy Protection, PCWORLD (June 29, 2001, 10:00 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/54183/consumers_are_key_to_privacy_protection.html
(noting
the pro-Free Market insights of some commentators, who equate the concept of “privacy” to that
of “happiness”).
48.
See Barnes, supra note 46; see also Symantec Insight, SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeid=insight (last visited Oct. 12, 2011)
(“Symantec Insight uses reputation security technology . . . to identify new threats as they are
created. Based on advanced data mining techniques, Insight seeks out changing encryption and
mutating code. Insight separates files at risk from those that are safe, for faster and more
accurate malware detection.”).
49.
See Richmond, supra note 27 (“To remove tracking programs and keep them out, it
is better to enlist the help of specialized software.”). The article then cites several programs
designed by privacy-focused companies other than Google, Microsoft, or Apple. Id.; see also
Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 (“Ironically, these opt-out systems work by installing a cookie
on your computer. That cookie tells ad networks to stop sending targeted ads to your computer.
Because these systems rely on a cookie to work, you'll need to opt out all over again any time you
delete cookies from your machine.”).
50.
See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1264, 1287 (2004) (“A URL is a pointer—it points to the location of particular information
on the Internet. . . . [I]t indicates where something is located. . . . URLs can reveal the specific
information that people are viewing on the Web. URLs can also contain search terms.”).
51.
See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction In Internet Law, 50 WM.
& MARY L. R. 2105, 2114 (2009) (“Unlike traditional letters, emails and web surfing
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following the changing URLs.52 There is no need to put code on a
consumer’s computer in order to know what URL the user wants to
see or where the user has been.53 Although cookies are invasive, they
are on the user’s computer where the user has some control over them.
In contrast, modern tracking techniques are often located outside of
the user’s technological control.
Moreover, the technology to remove cookies is at least as
invasive as the cookies themselves were.54 Norton/Symantec is the top
antivirus and spyware protection program in the country for
individual users.55 Ironically, their products come dangerously close
to resembling spyware. Norton must be invasive because it can no
longer rely on a standard antivirus model, in which protected
computers merely download known virus profiles.56 Certain attack
methods, such as the Zeus attack kit,57 can create one-off, custom-bred
viruses on a per computer or per attack basis.58 Therefore, since an

communications are often copied in transit by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and are (in
theory) easily accessed by ISP employees.”).
52.
See Solove, supra note 50.
53.
Id.; Tokson, supra note 51.
54.
They have to be: in order to remove cookies such as new advanced versions like
“super cookies” or “zombie cookies,” they must be able to identify the source and provenance of a
piece of code. See Christopher Drew & Verne G. Kopytoff, Deploying New Tools to Stop the
Hackers, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/technology/
18security.html; see also infra note 103 (discussing “zombie cookies”). Thus, for example, when
Norton/Symantec scans a document, it actually makes a copy of that document, compares the
document to similar or identical documents that have appeared on other Norton/Symantec users’
computers, and then determines whether those other users have become “sick” or have remained
healthy. See Drew & Kopytoff, supra. The best anti-botnet software is itself therefore a botnet.
See id.
55.
See Ashlee Vance, For Symantec and McAfee, ‘Arms Race’ for Security, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/technology/business-computing/06virus.html
(“In the consumer market, Symantec holds an even larger lead, with 52 percent share and $1.8
billion in revenue last year, compared with 18 percent of the market and $624 million in revenue
for McAfee. A host of smaller players like Trend Micro, CA and Kaspersky Lab round out the
field.”).
56.
See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54 (“Symantec’s strategy is to rate software based
on a number of factors including the file’s age and source. The company also checks data it
collects from users about the kind of software they have on their computers. Software used by
100,000 people is more likely to be good, while a file that no one else has is more likely to be
bad.”).
57.
See Riva Richmond, New Menace in the War Against Online Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2010, http://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/new-menace-in-the-war-against-cybercrime (“In the battle against online criminals, a new front has emerged involving Zeus, a
data-stealing Trojan horse that infects Windows PCs . . . . Stopping the new Zeus attack can be
tricky.”).
58.
See Peter Coogan, Zeus, King of the Underground Crimeware Toolkits, SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zeus-king-underground-crimeware-toolkits (last updated
Feb. 22, 2010).
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antivirus can only defend against what it has seen before, the past
antivirus approach is now largely obsolete.
In response, Norton/Symantec leveraged its large customer
base into a counter-botnet.59 That is, Norton customers together form
a network that reports suspicious programs to Norton.60 Norton can
then heavily supplement its blacklist model (stopping viruses that
appear on a list of antivirus definitions) and its whitelist model (only
allowing access to websites that are known to be clean) with a new
approach.61 This approach, termed reputational-based security,62 is a
more effective counter to viruses. As part of this reputational process,
the major antivirus programs not only record where their customers
go when they surf the Internet, but also download and scan documents
from their customers’ computers.63 Thus, antivirus programs can be
almost as bad as the threats they protect against, since they
automatically obtain customers’ web-surfing history and confidential
documents for offsite analysis.64 Much of this snooping and copying is
not transparent to users. Many Symantec users would be startled to
learn that their virus-protection program was downloading and
scanning all of their confidential information.65
Furthermore, due to overreaching corporate contracts,66
corporations have become emboldened to conduct searches of their
users’ equipment as part of the installed program.67 For example, a
video game creator might install deep-level invasive software that
scans the user’s hard drive and looks for unauthorized third-party
programs.68 Or, as in another recent scenario, a smartphone carrier
might install spyware that captures encrypted URL requests, SMS
message text, and email text, all under the auspices of an End User
License Agreement (EULA) that authorizes the carrier to monitor

59.
See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54.
60.
See id.
61.
See id.
62.
See Symantec Insight, supra note 48.
63.
See id.
64.
See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54.
65.
See id.
66.
See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 441 (2002) (“Courts have difficulty distinguishing between
terms that create a reasonable arrangement of risks and terms that constitute exploitation of
consumers. . . . [C]ourts typically frame the issue as a dispute between a single consumer and a
business, rather than as an aggregate policy that affects the vast majority of consumers and
businesses that transact with each other contentedly.”).
67.
See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2010).
68.
Id. at 936 (“Blizzard launched Warden, a technology that it developed to prevent its
players who use unauthorized third-party software, including bots, from connecting to [the
computer game World of Warcraft’s] servers.”).
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“usage information” to improve service.69 This little-known invasive
behavior is made possible via corporate contracts; the EULAs both
enable and facilitate this “on the computer” malware consumer
surveillance.70
They do not, however, reflect the consumer’s
meaningful or informed consent to be surveilled.71
Illegitimate surveillance programs also pose a significant
privacy risk. Encryption, anti-traffic analysis programs, and other
precautions are rendered useless if the data-gatherer can directly
access the data-receiving computer.72 For example, a hacker can
circumvent hard-to-penetrate encryption by installing a keylogger
onto the user’s hard drive that logs each keystroke the user enters,73
or through “socially-engineered” attacks.74 One of the most popular
and effective socially-engineered-attack methods involves learning
about a particular person’s interests and sending her a tailored
email.75 Once the user clicks on a malicious link within the email, the
69.
See Sherr & Troianovski, supra note 40. Another concern is where there is no
applicable policy. See Thurm & Kane, supra note 5 (“Many apps don’t offer even a basic form of
consumer protection: written privacy policies. Forty-five of the 101 apps didn’t provide privacy
policies on their websites . . . .”).
70.
See Barnes, supra note 46, at 1547 (“Millions of people likely have spyware on their
computers . . . . [T]hey may have ‘agreed’ to its installation by clicking their assent to a license
agreement that came with another program that they downloaded. . . . [T]he spyware application
may be performing . . . surveillance of every movement these consumers make on the Internet.”).
71.
See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 14, at 369 (“Many data transfers and uses by
companies occur without the meaningful informed consent of consumers. . . . There must be a
way to ensure that consumers can exercise meaningful informed consent about the uses and
dissemination of their personal information.” (emphasis added)); see also Mortensen v. Bresnan
Commc’n, No. CV 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 131419, at *12 (D. Mont. Dec. 13,
2010) (dismissing a class action allegation based on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
as defendant adequately notified plaintiff through its privacy disclosure and OnLine Subscriber
Agreement that it would collect and use plaintiff’s browsing behavior and through plaintiff’s use
of the internet service, consent was given or acquiesced to).
72.
See Tom Zeller Jr., Protecting Yourself from Keylogging Thieves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/technology/27hackside.html (“[E]ven with
[protective] measures in place, malicious code—including a keylogger—can sometimes find its
way onto your computer. . . . ‘With keyloggers, you’ve literally got someone sitting over your
shoulder watching everything that you do’ . . . .”).
73.
See Randall Stross, A Strong Password Isn’t the Strongest Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/business/05digi.html (“Keylogging software,
which is deposited on a PC by a virus, records all keystrokes—including the strongest passwords
you can concoct—and then sends it surreptitiously to a remote.”).
74.
See Sarah Granger, Social Engineering Fundamentals, Part I: Hacker Tactics,
SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/social-engineering-fundamentals-part-ihacker-tactics (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (“[H]ackers may obtain information on-line [sic] by
pretending to be the network administrator, sending e-mail through the network and asking for
a user’s password. This type of social engineering attack doesn’t generally work, because users
are generally more aware of hackers when online, but it is something of which to take note.”).
75.
Id. (“E-mail can also be used for more direct means of gaining access to a system. . . .
A good example of this was an AOL hack[:] . . . the hacker called AOL’s tech support and spoke
with the support person for an hour. . . . [and] mentioned that his car was for sale cheaply. The
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hacker gains access to the user’s system.76 Eventually the data from
an installed keylogger will reveal the user’s password, at which point
the hacker can know everything that the user knows.77
Online contracts between consumers and corporations permit
corporations to routinely install spying networks on consumers’
computers. But, a dangerous zone for corporations lies just beyond
the scope of those contracts.
When corporations exceed their
contractual grant, they are, like hackers, trespassers at best and
criminals at worst.78
A corporate-drafted contract is the sole difference between a
corporation and a hacker. Thus far, this fact has not made a notable
difference, since courts have permitted corporations the sole and
exclusive right to draft and enforce contract terms in the mass-market
consumer context.79 However, this legal framework cannot last.
Courts ought to recognize that consumers also have the right to set
legal limits, and courts should enforce those limits even though they
may be set forth in documents different from corporate-drafted EULAs
or Terms of Service. In short, just as a user must follow the Terms of
Use she agrees to upon accessing a corporation’s website, a
corporation should be equally bound to follow the individual’s pre-set
Terms of Use governing her private information.80
2. Over the Wire
The second basic threat to a consumer’s private information is
that a third party might intercept the message in transit, effectively
intercepting it “over the wire.” Although deep-packet inspection can
reveal much about what is inside a communication,81 analysts posit

tech supporter was interested, so the hacker sent an e-mail attachment ‘with a picture of the
car.’ Instead of a car photo, the mail executed a backdoor exploit that opened a connection out
from AOL through the firewall.”); see Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54 (“Unlike past blitzes of
spam with clunky sales pitches, today’s attacks often rely on a familiar face and are extremely
difficult to stop. In a practice known as spear phishing, hackers send e-mails that seem to come
from co-workers or friends and include attachments that can release malware to steal passwords
and other sensitive data.”).
76.
See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54.
77.
See Stross, supra note 73.
78.
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
79.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
80.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
81.
See Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the
Digital Age, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 92 (2005) (“[I]t [is] technically challenging to
classify traffic flows while they are actually moving across the network. . . . [D]eep packet
inspection promises to overcome some of these limitations. . . . A service provider could use deep
packet inspection to distinguish . . . traffic . . . and either block it or reduce its available
bandwidth.” (footnote omitted)).
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that current commercially available encryption can withstand even
military attempts to decrypt. Until some significant advance in
computing—quantum computing, for example—changes the nature of
decryption, current encryption is fairly secure.82
Despite this, many online companies refuse to use even basic
secure encryption. Most websites are simply hypertext transfer
protocol (http), not hypertext transfer protocol secure (https).83 Some
companies argue that making a website https is too expensive;
however, companies that have made the switch have not found the
costs prohibitive.84 Indeed, even small companies have switched to
secure connections.
Ixquick, a small company that runs a
privacy-oriented search engine, already encrypts all search requests.85
The problem has become one of entrenchment: for most websites, by
default the unencrypted http site comes up automatically. And unless
consumers access a website through a search engine, they often
request an unencrypted version by typing http instead of https in the
address.86 Encryption should be the default; instead, we find that by
default the Internet architecture permits third parties to capture
consumer data.
As with on-the-desktop problems, there are some technological
solutions that consumers can use to improve their over-the-wire
security. But, these solutions do not work well or comprehensively.
Users can fix some over-the-wire problems through a simple add-on,
82.
See Secure Sockets Layer (SSL): How It Works, SYMANTEC, http://www.verisign.
com/ssl/ssl-information-center/how-ssl-security-works (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (“Web servers
and Web browsers rely on the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol to create a uniquely
encrypted channel for private communications over the public Internet. . . . At current computing
speeds, a hacker with the time, tools, and motivation to attack using brute force would require a
trillion years to break [in] . . . .”).
83.
See Kate Murphy, New Hacking Tools Pose Bigger Threats to Wi-Fi Users, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/technology/personaltech/17basics.html
(discussing that not all websites have https and the few that do make it difficult to use).
84.
Id. (“Gmail made end-to-end encryption its default mode in January 2010.”); see also
Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in
the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 378 (2010) (“Google’s decision to adopt
encryption by default for its Gmail service remains a minority practice in the cloud computing
industry. Users of Facebook, MySpace, Yahoo and Microsoft are still vulnerable to the same data
theft and account hijacking attacks. While Google improved the security defaults for its Gmail
service in response to high-profile criticism from the security community, the other major Web
2.0 firms have shown little interest in deploying encryption technologies, and thus continue to
deliver their users’ private data over insecure connections. The problem, it seems, is industry
wide.”).
85.
See Ixquick Protects Your Privacy!, IXQUICK, https://www.ixquick.com/eng/protectprivacy.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2011) (discussing the search engines comparison to other
search engines and how it does not save your IP address); see also Privacy, DUCKDUCKGO,
https://www.duckduckgo.com/privacy.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (“DuckDuckGo does not
collect or share personal information. That is our privacy policy in a nutshell.”).
86.
See Kesan & Shah, supra note 45, at 601.
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such as HTTPS Everywhere—created by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation in conjunction with the Tor Project.87 HTTPS Everywhere
requests an https-secured connection wherever one is available.88 The
add-on changes the default setting from an unencrypted connection to
an encrypted one. But add-ons can only request an encrypted
connection. If the corporation does not offer secure connections, the
add-on can do little other than alert the user.
The actors who pose the greatest threat for interception over
the wire are actually not hackers, but the legitimate entities that
provide Internet access services.89 Indeed, in many cases the threat is
from employers, who function as ISPs.90 Employers may use this
function to intrude further into the personal lives of their employees.91
A recent Supreme Court case, for example, gave employers broad
access to text messages on an employee’s personal cell phone.92
Because employers control the wires and may not have their
employees’ best interests at heart, this can lead to serious privacy
implications.
An ISP’s power over data as it crosses the wire is so efficient
and effective that in many authoritarian countries ISPs provide the
means of state control.93 Although almost every website is accessible
in Saudi Arabia, the state logs the majority of web contact.94 China
takes a different approach: using what it is able to detect through
over-the-wire and packet inspection technologies to censor what

87.
See Murphy, supra note 83 (“[T]he Electronic Frontier Foundation in collaboration
with the Tor Project, another group concerned with Internet privacy, released in June an add-on
to the browser Firefox, called Https Everywhere.”).
88.
See id. (“The extension . . . makes ‘https’ the stubbornly unchangeable default on all
sites that support it.”).
89.
See Werbach, supra note 81, at 92-93.
90.
See Jill Yung, Big Brother is Watching: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought
Orwell’s 1984 to Life and What the Law Should do About it, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 163, 165
(2005) (“The alarm bells went off when . . . Internet tracking software debuted in workplaces.
Still, these practices, limited somewhat by a need to show business-relatedness, have largely
found acceptance in some form.” (footnote omitted)).
91.
Id. at 165 n.8 (“GPS is a prime example of ‘technology [that enables] employers to
gather enormous amounts of data about employees, often far beyond what is necessary to satisfy
safety or productivity concerns.’” (alteration in original)).
92.
See City of Ont. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632-33 (2010); see also Louise L. Hill,
Gone but Not Forgotten: When Privacy, Policy and Privilege Collide, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 565, 586 (2011) (“The Supreme Court determined that the City's search of Quon’s text
messages was reasonable. ‘Although as a general matter, warrantless searches “are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,”’ there is an exception for ‘the “special needs” of the
workplace.’”).
93.
See Dawn C. Nunziato, How (Not) to Censor: Procedural First Amendment Values
and Internet Censorship Worldwide, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1123, 1124-26 (2011).
94.
Id. at 1150-52.
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citizens see.95
Even in the United States, ISPs retain broad
over-the-wire control. Apple’s iPhone tracked users wherever they
went, and then stored that data unencrypted on the device.96 Google
engages in comparable efforts with Android.97 Most smartphones in
the United States recently carried the Carrier IQ software,98 which
intercepted user communications and secure data requests, and sent
the information to the user’s ISP.99 Security over the wire, in the form
of secure encrypted communications, thus is not technology that only
special people use or need to keep their extraordinary secrets.
Instead, it is something that should be standard on every connection
and for every device.100
For purposes of the present analysis, the secured connection
issue provides a useful data point. For secured connections, the
consumer can set the terms on which data will be transmitted and the
corporation must acquiesce or refuse the connection. This basic
principle should be extended to other methods of communication
through which a consumer wishes to make her data available. A

95.
Id. at 1148; see also Christopher Rhoads & Loretta Chao, Iran’s Web Spying Aided
by Western Technology, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124562668777335653.html (“China’s vaunted ‘Great Firewall,’ which is widely considered the
most advanced and extensive Internet censoring in the world, is believed also to involve deep
packet inspection.”).
96.
See Julia Angwin & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect User Data,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870398370457627710
1723453610.html; see also Apple Q&A On Location Data, APPLE (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.
apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html (“Sometime in the next few
weeks Apple will release a free iOS software update that: reduces the size of the crowd-sourced
Wi-Fi hotspot and cell tower database cached on the iPhone, ceases backing up this cache, and
deletes this cache entirely when Location Services is turned off. In the next major iOS software
release the cache will also be encrypted on the iPhone.”).
97.
See Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 96; see also In re Google Android
Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 2011) (“Plaintiffs contend, inter
alia, that Google engaged in improper business practices and violated users’ privacy by using and
sharing plaintiffs’ data without authorization.”).
98.
See Marguerite Reardon, Sprint Updates Phones To Eliminate Carrier IQ, CNET
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-57360436-266/sprint-updates-phones-toeliminate-carrier-iq.
99.
See Sherr & Troianovski, supra note 40 (“Some wireless carriers, including Sprint
Nextel Corp., AT&T Inc. and T-Mobile USA, ask some of their phone manufacturers to put
Carrier IQ on their devices. Each said they use the technology to monitor their networks and
improve service.”).
100.
Moreover, the ban on researching encryption technologies embodied in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act has put the United States ten years behind the competition for secure
data on handheld devices. See Vicky Ku, Note, A Critique of the Digital Millenium Copyright
Act’s Exemption on Encryption Research: Is the Exemption Too Narrow?, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH.
465, 478 (2005) (“To have your adversary acknowledge that defending a lawsuit based on
violations of the DMCA would create a chilling effect on research, is a pretty strong suggestion
that it is true.”); see also Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 535-36 (2003).
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handshake protocol request101 is a request for technical rules that the
computer must follow to connect. Corporations should honor a
handshake protocol request not to be tracked on precisely the same
grounds as a handshake protocol requesting a secured connection.
3. Online Service Providers
It may seem obvious that this Article would focus on the data
collected by online websites, mobile application providers, and vendors
of consumer data. Permitting users a meaningful, unitary opt-out
choice to avoid corporate surveillance is, after all, the goal of this
Article. But the technology by which third parties gather and
aggregate this data is simple and startling enough to merit attention.
Cookies have advanced technologically.102 Zombie cookies103
now resurrect themselves after the user deletes them; how can a court
see that as anything but a violation of the user’s clearly-stated
preference?104 Google Ads display banner advertisements across a
large swath of the Internet.105 These advertisements, which sit on a
different server than the main website accessed, redirect the user
when clicked and retain the IP address of the computer that viewed
the advertisement.106 By simple aggregation, Google Ads can track a
101.
See Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 45 (2003) (“The Internet is not a monolithic, uniform network;
rather, it is a network of networks . . . . In order to provide end users with universal connectivity,
Internet backbones must interconnect . . . . Interconnection agreements between Internet
backbone providers are reached through commercial negotiations in a ‘handshake’
environment.”).
102.
See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 2 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446862 (“We found that top 100 websites are
using Flash cookies to ‘respawn,’ or recreate deleted HTTP cookies. This means that
privacy-sensitive consumers who ‘toss’ their HTTP cookies to prevent tracking or remain
anonymous are still being uniquely identified online by advertising companies.” (footnote
omitted)).
103.
Id. Zombie cookies are literally http code that cannot be deleted without significant
efforts. What are Zombie Cookies? How do I Delete Them? GEEKMATICS (May 6, 2011),
http://www.geekmatics.com/posts/320.
104.
See Complaint at 2-3, Valdez v. Quantcast Corp., No. CV10-05484 (C.D. Cal. July
23, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/cookielawsuit073010.pdf
(filing suit because of violations of privacy from cookies that recreate themselves after deletion);
see also Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Lawsuit Tackles Files that ‘Re-Spawn’ Tracking Cookies,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/07/30/lawsuit-tackles-files-that-respawn-tracking-cookies (“‘The story is not about cookies,’ said Scott Kamber, a privacy lawyer
involved in the suit. ‘The story is about tracking you without consent. The fact that it has a
benign name like “cookies” has nothing to do with it.’ He said the cookies found . . . ‘deliberately
circumvent controls you set on your computer.’” (emphasis added)).
105.
See Claire Cain Miller, Google Campaign to Build Up its Display Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/business/media/22adco.html.
106.
See Privacy Policy, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/rights/privacy/
policy/privacy-policy.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2011) (“The New York Times logs Internet
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user across the Internet through all the banner advertisements she
views as she surfs.107 Compounding the problem, some ISPs do not
shift the IP addresses they allocate to users, or, if they do, they
maintain meticulous multi-year records regarding which IP address
was tied to which user.108 For example, Sprint assigns mobile
telephone users a single, static IP address for their data connection.109
Any website operator or advertisement server that encounters the
user’s IP address, or other assigned static ID number, can be certain
that it is interacting with the same person as last time, and can also
identify the user as the same person who used that IP address on
other websites.110
Advertisers and online service providers have found ways to
aggregate information gathered from IP address tracking, thereby
achieving total surveillance of the consumer from logon to logout.111
More significantly, contract law blindly assumes that the user agreed
to comprehensive and perniciously intrusive surveillance merely by
virtue of terms of use that do not even appear on the visited
website.112
Protocol (IP) addresses . . . . We use this information in an aggregate fashion to track access to
our Web sites and mobile applications. . . . The New York Times . . . also transmits
non-personally identifiable Web site usage information about visitors to the servers of a
reputable third party for the purpose of targeting our Internet banner advertisements on other
sites. To do this, we use Web Beacons in conjunction with cookies . . . .”).
107.
Google now tracks users across any services of Google they use. See Preview: Privacy
Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/preview (last updated Mar. 1,
2012) (“We use the information we collect from all of our services to provide, maintain, protect
and improve them, to develop new ones, and to protect Google and our users.”). This new privacy
policy went live on March 1, 2012, and consolidated the different privacy policies for each product
and service Google offers. Id.
108.
See Dep’t of Justice, Retention Periods of Major Cellular Service Providers, WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/09/retentionpolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 29,
2012) (outlining data gathered by the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, U.S.
Department of Justice); see also Klinefelter, supra note 24, at 2 (“Sites also regularly collect the
date and time that a researcher from a particular IP address visits their site. Some websites may
retain user information indefinitely.” (footnote omitted)).
109.
See Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging
Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 210 (2011)
(“Sprint Nextel assigns each Internet-connected wireless handset a static IP address and logs the
allocation of these addresses for a twenty-four month period. The company also logs the URL of
each webpage viewed by its customers . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
110.
Id. at 210-11; see Thurm & Kane, supra note 5 (“Among all apps tested, the most
widely shared detail was the unique ID number assigned to every phone.”); see also Rubinstein et
al., supra note 5, at 272 (noting that “[r]ecent privacy concerns now center on web services—and
especially search engines”); Advertising and Privacy, supra note 14.
111.
See Soghoian, supra note 109, at 211 (“[A] Sprint Nextel customer can later be
tracked down based on an anonymous comment left on a blog or a peer-to-peer (P2P) file
downloaded over the company's cellular network, while customers of T-Mobile and Cricket can
freely engage in a variety of online activities without any risk of later discovery.”).
112.
Id. at 192-94.

566

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:3:545

A user generally has only one ISP, but online service providers
are far more numerous. As aggressive or intrusive as ISP contracts
with consumers may be, they are still limited in number, and
therefore plausibly manageable for the consumer. If it is improbable
that consumers will be able to manage their privacy in one
corporate-drafted ISP contract, then it is absolutely impossible that
they will be able to do so across thousands of different online service
provider contracts. The current system places almost all privacy
transaction costs on consumers’ shoulders.113 Consumers are set up to
fail, because to protect their privacy, they must digest, update, and
maintain enough legal information to stump a supercomputer. There
is a simpler alternative.
Courts could enforce the consumer’s
one-time, unitary expressed preference in the form of a do-not-track
flag.
Thus, this Article does not contest the enforceability of online,
automated, and standardized contracts, but rather asserts that
consumers should have the same power to benefit from such contracts
as do corporations. Many scholars already argue that courts should
neither enforce these contracts of extra adhesion beyond standard
terms that consumers expect,114 nor permit widespread consumer
surveillance.115 Judges, however, lack any principled rationale to
apply different reasoning to consumer-proffered contracts than they do
to corporate-proffered contracts.116
Therefore, if Google’s terms-of-use agreement, residing
somewhere on a Google server, is binding upon any user who views a
Google Ad, then a fortiori a consumer’s terms-of-data-use contract
113.
See Julia Angwin & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Microsoft, Facebook Offer New Approaches
to Boost Web Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
052748704692904576166820102959428.html (“Facebook consolidated many of its settings into a
control panel designed to make it easier for users to adjust when and how their information was
shared with other users and third parties.”); Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Security Flaw Exposed
User Accounts, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
3730804576315682856383872.html (discussing Facebook’s complex ecosystem of apps and their
data flows). This is only one of many examples illustrating the corporate default setting to full
tracking of consumers’ information. See also Kesan & Shah, supra note 45; discussion infra note
120.
114.
See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard
Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 272 (2007)
(discussing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) as a way to protect consumers against
questionable terms in form contracts).
115.
See Kirsch, supra note 3, at 54-65 (suggesting that the upcoming revision of the
European Union’s Data Protection Directive should require advertisers to use and respect a
do-not-track mechanism for consumers to meaningfully consent, or not, to online tracking for use
in behavioral advertising); Steindel, supra note 3, at 483-88 (discussing the problem of online
tracking for consumers and offering that federal legislation should implement a do-not-track
browser option to protect consumers).
116.
See sources cited supra note 6.
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should be binding upon a corporation that must interact directly with
that consumer’s computer. Online corporate contracts perhaps should
not be so easily enforceable. But, if they are so strong in corporate
hands, they should be equally strong in the hands of consumers.
B. The Failure of Consumers’ Self-Help Solutions
Industry advocates claim that consumers should engage in
technological self-help, known commonly as Privacy Enhancing
Technology (PETs), as a means for constraining corporate
overreaching.117 But why should law not also be available to help
consumers end the privacy arms race? Corporations receive the aid of
the law to constrain technological arms races and stop bad actors,118
but the law relegates consumers to self-help in order to protect their
data. It makes little sense that while multinational corporations
cannot keep their data secure without the enforcement of strong laws,
the law expects consumers to do precisely that. The double standard
is startling.
Law is well positioned to intervene in precisely this sort of case,
where the technological arms race to defend a legal interest would cost
both sides more than the cost of legal enforcement. Arms races are
expensive, and when they do not have payoffs in the form of increased
competition, law often steps in and stops the race.119 That is, at least,
the theory. To test whether it is true, however, one must inquire
whether the law is as conducive to stopping arms races that are
hurting consumers as it is to stopping arms races that are harming
multinational corporations.
Courts should enforce a consumer’s expressed preference for
privacy instead of leaving consumers to be responsible for buying and
using products that defend consumer privacy, or worse, responsible for
reading and comprehending thousands of pages of EULAs and
perennially shifting privacy policies. The opposing and ostensibly

117.
See LESSIG, supra note 30, at 228 (discussing Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PETs)); see also Angwin & Fowler, supra note 113 (“A Microsoft spokeswoman said the
company's proposed do-not-track feature is part of a suite of privacy tools that the company
hopes can gain broad industry support. . . . Facebook consolidated many of its settings into a
control panel designed to make it easier for users to adjust when and how their information was
shared with other users and third parties.”); Jonathan Mayer, Tracking the Trackers: Self-Help
Tools, CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 13, 2011, 3:35 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
node/6730 (discussing an empirical review of tracking, finding that “[m]ost desktop browsers
currently do not support effective self-help tools” and “vary substantially in performance”).
118.
See Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top File-Sharing Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/indictment-charges-megauploadsite-with-piracy.html; see also sources cited supra note 29.
119.
See sources cited supra note 29.
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free-market view argues that corporations are free to take what they
want, but consumers must pay (in terms of time spent surveying
varied and complex privacy policies or buying privacy-enhancing
technologies) to make it stop.120 That is neither a market nor free. A
free market would involve legal protection for consumer interests, as
expressed in contractual terms, that is at least equal to a corporation’s
ability to do likewise.
One predictable pushback is that leveling the playing field
between consumer- and corporate-drafted contracts is only necessary
if a consumer’s other technological self-help options are inadequate.
They plainly are—it is nearly impossible for a consumer to achieve
even a low level of security.121 First of all, every application has a
different threat profile.122 Since every application has to legitimately
demand control over a significant amount of data and
120.
In a Coasean transaction-free universe, this would not be a problem. The difficulty
is that the transaction costs in online contracting are backwards: it is cheaper for users to
express their preference not to be tracked once, in a single, unitary do-not-track option in their
browser, than for users to read and navigate thousands of privacy policies on thousands of sites.
See LESSIG, supra note 30; see also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of
Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 544-50 (2008-09) (“Studies show
privacy policies are hard to read, read infrequently, and do not support rational decision
making. . . . Privacy policies should help reduce information asymmetries because companies
share information with their customers. However, researchers also note that if the cost for
reading privacy policies is too high, people are unlikely to read policies.”); Jeff Sovern, The Coase
Theorem and the Power to Increase Transaction Costs, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 935, 943 (2009)
[hereinafter Coase and Transaction Costs] (“The ability of financial institutions to inflate
consumer transaction costs is not unique. . . . Online sellers sometimes hide unattractive terms
in privacy notices.”); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of
Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1637 (2006) [hereinafter Consumer
Protection] (“In many circumstances, businesses benefit by increasing consumer transaction costs
to the detriment of consumers. Indeed some practices are profitable largely because they inflate
consumer transaction costs. Accordingly, firms increase consumer transaction costs because
doing so enriches them.”).
121.
See Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 (“Ironically, these opt-out systems work by
installing a cookie on your computer. That cookie tells ad networks to stop sending targeted ads
to your computer. Because these systems rely on a cookie to work, you'll need to opt out all over
again any time you delete cookies from your machine.”); see also Michael Riley & Sara Forden,
Hacking of DuPont, J&J, GE Were Google-Type Attacks That Weren’t Disclosed, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 8, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-08/hacking-of-dupont-j-j-gewere-google-type-attacks-that-weren-t-disclosed.html (“‘You can’t buy enough security to match
the threat today,’ said Anup Ghosh, chief executive officer of the cyber security firm Invincea Inc.
. . . ‘[W]e continue to find malware from early 2009 . . .’ one HBGary investigator wrote . . . .”).
These two comments are in the context of hackers and large corporations and government
entities. See Riley & Forden, supra. The example is clear—these large corporations can scarcely
protect themselves. See id.
122.
See Drew & Kopytoff, supra note 54 (“Companies like Symantec, the giant Internet
security firm, are introducing services that assess the ‘reputation’ of software, weighing factors
like how old it is and how widely it is used to decide if it is safe.”); see also Fowler, supra note 113
(“‘Facebook’s complex ecosystem—with thousands of independent apps and complex data flows to
and from apps—is a problem of its own creation,’ said Ben Edelman, an assistant professor at
Harvard Business School.”).
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computer-processing power in order to function, the human user
cannot vet every decision each application makes.123
Second, even consumers who responsibly use antivirus and
anti-intrusion programs, and who fairly regularly dispose of junk
information by using cleaning programs, remain at significant risk.
Grey-market companies still rely on the complexity of computer use
and disposal of information to gather information about the user.124
Similarly, security over the wire, like basic encryption, can be
prohibitive to obtain because most websites and browsers do not
accept or allow encrypted connections.125 Even the most basic
safeguards, therefore, such as requesting an encrypted connection, are
often simply not available to the consumer.126
Moreover, encrypted connections do not provide complete
protection. Encrypted connections can be analyzed by the type of
traffic. For example, deep-packet inspection technology currently
permits ISPs to differentiate Internet traffic—telephony, movies,
music, and so on—and charge separate prices for different kinds of
traffic.127 Further, governments have circumvented strong encryption
by using software that hacks a user’s computer and intercepts
communications before it becomes encrypted.128
Thus, the

123.
See Barnes, supra note 114, at 253-59.
124.
See Thurm & Kane, supra note 5.
125.
See Klinefelter, supra note 24, at 15 (“While some research websites such as
LexisNexis, Westlaw, and Google Search allow for . . . encrypted communication, a number of
websites that attorneys use . . . do not . . . . For example, twenty-seven state bar associations
provide access to the legal research service Casemaker as a benefit of membership, but this
service does not offer encrypted access.” (footnote omitted)); see also Murphy, supra note 83
(“[W]hile the password you initially enter on Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, Amazon,
eBay and The New York Times is encrypted, the Web browser’s cookie, a bit of code that that
identifies your computer, your settings on the site or other private information, is often not
encrypted.”).
126.
See sources cited supra note 125.
127.
See Klinefelter, supra note 24, at 14 n.62 (discussing how deep-packet inspection of
the contents of Internet communications gives service providers the option to prioritize or create
tiered pricing by type of communication in order to address the challenges to the capacities of
Internet infrastructure); see also Saul Hansell, The Economics of Snooping on Internet Traffic,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/the-economics-of-snoopingon-internet-traffic (“There are a lot of other things deep packet inspection can do that are
perceived as rather creepy. It is great for spies and secret police, who want to know when people
read or write about certain topics. It can identify people who send copyrighted files and block
people from using certain programs, like BitTorrent. Advertisements can be shown based on
what sites Internet users visit.”).
128.
See Steve Stecklow et al., Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion,
WALL ST. J., June 1, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304520804576345970
862420038.html (“In recent years, a handful of small European companies . . . have developed
tools to eavesdrop on Skype. . . . Most of the tools are programs that must be installed on a
person’s computer. Often they are distributed via infected email attachments . . . . The software
doesn’t decode Skype’s encryption, but instead captures audio streams . . . on the computer.”).
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technological arms race continues, and individual consumers are
largely the losers.
These are just the problems of encryption—the difficulties
involved in protecting what is inside one’s own communications.
Another serious concern is with whom one is communicating.
Democracy activists in authoritarian regimes particularly care about
protecting the identity of parties with whom they communicate.129
Unsurprisingly, there are far fewer resources available to protect
individuals who want to keep this information private than there are
available to help governments.130
The only current, but imperfect, solution to traffic analysis131 is
a proxy. A proxy is a computer that acts as an untraceable post office
box for an Internet user.132
A traffic analyst can track the
communication back to the proxy, but not to the person who was using
it.133 Yet there are several problems with using proxies to prevent
unwanted traffic analysis. First, proxies sometimes retain data logs of
their users’ activities.134 If they do, all of the problems engendered by
corporate retention of consumer data still arise.135 In addition, proxies
that retain user activity logs are one-stop shops for government
129.
Id. (“[Y]oung dissidents in Egypt were organizing an election-monitoring project last
fall, they discussed their plans over Skype . . . believing it to be secure. But someone else was
listening in—Egypt’s security service. An internal memo . . . boasted it had intercepted one
conversation in which an activist stressed the importance of using Skype ‘because it cannot be
penetrated online by any security device.’”).
130.
Id. (“A cottage industry of U.S. and other companies is now designing and selling
tools that can be used to block or eavesdrop on Skype conversations. . . . To enter the Chinese
market in 2004, Skype agreed to a unique arrangement in which a special version of its software
there filters users’ text chats and blocks politically sensitive keywords.”); see also 47 U.S.C. §
1002 (2006); Rubinstein et al., supra note 5, at 281 (“Congress enacted CALEA to preserve the
ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance involving digital telephony.
This law requires telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications
equipment to design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that a required level of
surveillance capabilities will be built in.”).
131.
That is, tools employed by service providers, recipient websites, bad actors, or others
to determine to which websites a user is connected. See generally Adam Candeub & Daniel John
McCartney, Network Transparency: Seeing the Neutral Network, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
228, 228-30 (2010) (discussing the problems faced by the Internet and the fundamental need for
traffic analysis, ensuring effective communications but screening for unwanted content).
132.
See Joel Michael Schwarz, ‘A Case of Identity’: A Gaping Hole in the Chain of
Evidence of Cyber-Crime, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 92, 95 (2003) (“[T]he proxy server often
functions as a security gate and firewall between the internal network and the public Internet.
To accomplish this, a proxy server substitutes its own IP address for the IP addresses of its
subordinate computers behind the firewall, thus preserving their anonymity by masking their IP
addresses from anyone outside on the Internet.” (footnote omitted)).
133.
Id.
134.
Id. at 95-96 (“[A]t the time traffic passes into and out of the proxy server/firewall,
the proxy server often captures the source and destination IP addresses, thereby giving rise to a
virtual footprint.”).
135.
See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
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entities that wish to record user traffic.136 Since the traffic is
communicated to a third party, courts generally do not require a
warrant.137 While handing a letter to a US postal service worker, a
government employee, does not permit the government to open it,138
courts have persisted in allowing governments to review users’
activity logs.139 But, the present inquiry views privacy through the
lens of contract law and does not make constitutional analyses and
arguments, however numerous and important they may be.140
The second problem is that proxies do not prevent traffic
analysis because the tools for traffic analysis are advancing. Social
networks are mappable and trackable.141 A person’s social network
136.
See Schwarz, supra note 132, at 98-100 (detailing the use of virtual “footprints” and
the use of proxy servers as they stored data in United States v. Hoke, the first major online
securities fraud cases).
137.
See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), No.
1:11-DM-3, 2011 WL 5508991, at *17 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (“Even if Petitioners had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in IP address information collected by Twitter, Petitioners
voluntarily relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine. To
access Twitter, Petitioners had to disclose their IP addresses to third parties.”); see also United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed.”). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[Plaintiff] enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails vis-à-vis . . . his Internet
Service Provider. Thus, government agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by compelling
[his ISP] to turn over the emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”
(citation omitted)). The court made this holding based upon the analogy of emails and the
Internet to the US postal system. Id. at 286.
138.
See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286 (“[T]he police may not storm the post office and
intercept a letter . . . .”).
139.
Compare Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (detailing the role of a recipient of information and
the loss of Fourth Amendment protections), with Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288 (distinguishing from
an intended recipient and finding the ISP in the case was an intermediary). If we accept that an
email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest that agents of the government cannot
compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the Fourth
Amendment. See generally Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286. An ISP is the intermediary through which
emails must pass in order for email communication to be possible. Mike Masnick, Appeal Court
Says Emails are Protected by the 4th Amendment, TECHDIRT (Dec. 14, 2010, 3:09 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101214/12144812273/appeals-court-says-emails-areprotected-4th-amendment.shtml.
140.
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 41, at 563, 563 n.5 (“The third-party doctrine is the
Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate. It is the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely
criticized as profoundly misguided. . . . A list of every article or book that has criticized the
doctrine would make this the world's longest law review footnote.”).
141.
See Nate Anderson, How One Man Tracked Down Anonymous—And Paid a Heavy
Price, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 10, 2011, 3:31 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/02/
anonymous/all/1 (“Aaron Barr [the CEO of security firm HBGary Federal] believed he had
penetrated Anonymous . . . [the] loose hacker collective . . . . But matching their online identities
to real-world names and locations proved daunting . . . . Barr . . . used social media data and
subterfuge to map those names to three real people, two in California and one in New York.”).
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and online contacts are serviceable digital fingerprints.142 The final
problem is that protections from online service providers are negligible
or impracticable.143 Each site has its own hidden and obscure “privacy
policy,”144 which is in fact the terms under which the corporation will
expropriate the users’ data.145
These privacy policies are
take-it-or-leave-it propositions that are generally applicable; one size
fits all members who access a site.146
A consumer who wishes to protect her privacy through self-help
must use encryption on her computer and must read and judge
thousands of pages of EULAs for the programs she installs.147 She
must use a browser that permits her to refuse cookies. She must
request secure connections wherever possible.148 She must use traffic
analysis avoidance software, such as the TOR Onion Router, which
bounces traffic all over the world before it exits from an anonymized
node.149 She must use AdBlock Plus or some similar add-on to prevent
banner advertisements from reporting her online traffic.150 If she
142.
Id.
143.
In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(“[H]olding that a defendant was not liable under the Stored Communications Act for disclosing
personal information of which it was the intended recipient, even if the defendant was
‘contractually bound by its privacy policy not to disclose . . . information’ and could be held liable
for breach of contract for doing so.” (citing In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370 F. Supp. 2d
552, 560-61 (N.D. Tex. 2005)).
144.
See James P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision-Making
Strategies and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 4
(2005) (“[D]espite the proliferation of privacy policies online, consumers’ privacy interests may in
fact be no better protected today than they were ten years ago. . . . [T]here may be little incentive
for online businesses to adopt and adhere to strong privacy policies. It is the appearance of
privacy that seems to matter most.”); see also Thurm & Kane, supra note 5 (“An examination of
101 popular smartphone ‘apps’ . . . . reveal[s] the intrusive effort by online-tracking companies to
gather personal data . . . . Forty-five of the 101 apps didn’t provide privacy policies on their
websites . . . .”).
145.
See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Julia Angwin & Tom
McGinty, Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703977004575393173432219064.html
(“Dictionary.com . . . installed 168 tracking tools that didn't let users decline to be tracked, and
121 tools that, according to their privacy statements, don't rule out collecting financial or health
data.”).
146.
See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(describing the user agreement of PayPal).
147.
See Vance, supra note 55 (discussing the different antivirus companies); see also
McAfee Consumer Products End User License Agreement, MCAFEE, http://home.mcafee.com/root/
aboutus.aspx?id=eula (last visited Dec. 28, 2011); Product License Agreements, SYMANTEC,
http://www.symantec.com/about/profile/policies/eulas (last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (linking to the
numerous different products for consumer use and their license agreements).
148.
See Stecklow et al., supra note 128; see also Soghoian, supra note 84.
149.
See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 44 (2008).
150.
See Getting Started with Adblock Plus, ABLOCK PLUS, http://adblockplus.org/
en/getting_started (last visited Dec. 18, 2011) (describing Adblock Plus as a program that blocks
advertisements on websites and can be modified with filters based on geographic location or
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carries a cellular phone, she faces the same difficulties with the added
problem that the mobile device tracks her everywhere she travels in
real space.151 And even if she finds applications that block, delete, or
redirect this information, recent scientific studies show that third
parties can still track her.152
Instead of permitting this unreasonable situation to persist,
the law should permit a consumer to select a simple one-time browser
option that expresses her unwillingness to be tracked.153 Courts could
enforce that simple term the way they have been enforcing corporate
contracts for years—favorably.
II. OUTLINING ONLINE CONTRACTING LAW
This Part discusses some trends in online contracting law, and
isolates the impulses and analyses that have caused courts to
systematically enforce corporate terms against consumers,154 while
denying consumers the right to proffer their own terms against

privacy preferences). But see Allowing Acceptable Ads in Adblock Plus, ADBLOCK PLUS,
http://adblockplus.org/en/acceptable-ads (last visited Dec. 17, 2011) (discussing the switch to a
changeable default setting where non-intrusive advertisements will be allowed where before they
were not).
151.
See Julia Angwin & Scott Thurm, Judges Weigh Phone Tacking, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203733504577024092345458210.html
(“The use of cellphone tracking by authorities is among the most common types of electronic
surveillance, exceeding wiretaps and the use of GPS tracking, according to a survey of local, state
and federal authorities by The Wall Street Journal.”); see also Valentino-Devries, supra note 44
(detailing the steps that users can take to avoid being tracked online, such as browser setting
changes and the different programs a user can download and manage).
152.
See Pedro G. Lean et al., Why Johnny Can’t Opt Out: A Usability Evaluation of
Tools to Limit Online Behavioral Advertising, CARNEGIE MELLON U. CYLAB (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.cylab.cmu.edu/files/pdfs/tech_reports/CMUCyLab11017.pdf (“We present results of a
45-participant laboratory study investigating the usability of tools to limit online behavioral
advertising (OBA). . . . None of the nine tools we tested empowered study participants to
effectively control tracking and behavioral advertising according to their personal preferences.”
(emphasis added)); Valentino-Devries, supra note 44 (“If you opt out, you won't be shown ads tied
to your browsing behavior from the member networks. But you'll still see ads, which may be
placed based on criteria such as your location.”).
153.
See Nick Wingfield & Julia Angwin, Microsoft Adds Do-Not-Track Tool to Browser,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033639045762
00981919667762.html (discussing Microsoft’s implementation of a Do-Not-Track feature);
Mozilla: Do Not Track, MOZILLA, http://dnt.mozilla.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (noting that
Mozilla Firefox includes a Do Not Track option); see also Allowing Acceptable Ads in Adblock
Plus, supra note 150 (“In particular, we want to require that user’s privacy is respected
(mandatory Do Not Track support). However, we are not yet in a position to enforce that
requirement.”).
154.
See Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1635-36 (“Courts rarely look to the privacy settings or
other elements of a website where users specify their privacy preferences because these settings
and elements are typically not considered part of any contract or promise to the user.”); Knapp,
supra note 6 (discussing how dominance of the drafter has become typical in contract law).
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corporations.155 Even well-meaning courts cannot build contracts that
protect consumer privacy using only corporate-drafted terms.156
Before beginning the legal discussion, a statement of
limitations is appropriate. There is an extensive and developed
literature on the various rules of contract formation, and the rules’
moral and economic ramifications.157 This Article does not replicate
that research, rather, this Article mentions several example rules,
laws, and cases for what they fail to accomplish: they do not generally
operate to permit consumers to offer and enforce their own online
contract terms.158 The rules mentioned are regularly used to construe
only the corporation’s contractual terms.159 Courts only enforce the
consumers’ preferences to the extent that the corporate contract
embodies them: either actually (rare except for the price and quantity
terms)160 or impliedly (by courts seeking to construe corporate contract
terms in a pro-consumer fashion).161
This preference for
corporate-drafted terms does not appear within the legal rules

155.
See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 21 (addressing the lack of consumer choice in
accepting boilerplate language in standard form contracts).
156.
See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147,
1169-70 (2010) (“One key element is the courts' effective elimination of the concept of agreement.
There is no ‘meeting of the minds’ . . . . [C]ontracts are presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In
many situations, courts enforce contracts and changes in contract terms as long as the company
notified the consumer . . . . Notice has replaced agreement as a crucial element of contract
formation.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent
Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law In Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067,
1072 (2006) (“[T]he common law doctrine of unconscionability has proved difficult to define and
has been rarely invoked undoubtedly because, other than in exceptional cases, it has been largely
viewed as grossly interfering with the freedom of contract.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 66; Knapp, supra note 6; Lemley, supra note 6.
157.
See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 156; Giesela Rühl, The Battle of the Forms:
Comparative and Economic Observations, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 189 (2003); Amelia Rawls,
Note, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 200 (2009).
158.
See Knapp, supra note 6.
159.
See id.; see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir.
2002) (“[A] consumer’s clicking on a download button does not communicate assent to contractual
terms if the offer did not make clear to the consumer that clicking on the download button would
signify assent to those terms . . . .”); Fisher v. MediSense, Inc., No. 95-1004-PFK, 1995 WL
396613, at *6 (D. Kan. June 29, 1995) (“Undue influence is not proven, nor is a contract
unconscionable, merely because a corporation drafts a contract.”).
160.
See, e.g., Cole v. Sandel Med. Indus., LLC, 413 F. App’x 683, 686-87 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t is clear that no contract was created between Cole and Sandel when she submitted her idea
via the online submission form. . . . The agreement left open what price, if any, would be paid to
Cole. Accordingly, the online submission form is not an enforceable agreement to compensate
Cole for her idea.”).
161.
See, e.g., Specht, 306 F.3d at 29-30; see Knapp, supra note 6.
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themselves, but rather in how those rules are actually applied.162 This
opens the door for this Article’s argument: courts should bind
corporations to consumer-expressed preferences in exactly the same
way that courts have bound consumers to corporate-drafted contract
terms.
A. Corporate and Consumer Contracts under Online Contracting
Regimes
For online service transactions, courts use regular,
common-law rules for contracting—often drawn from the Restatement
of Contracts.163 The application of Restatement rules often favors
corporations under the “mirror image”164 or common-law “last shot”
rule,165 since the corporation is able to structure the transaction in
such a way as to benefit itself.166 The Restatement contains some
useful
provisions
for
limiting
corporate
contractual
overreaching—unconscionability,167 for example—by finding that a
consumer is not bound by what she has not understood to be part of
162.
See Fisher, 1995 WL 396613, at *6 (“Undue influence is not proven, nor is a contract
unconscionable, merely because a corporation drafts a contract.”); see also DiMatteo & Rich,
supra note 156; Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1635-36.
163.
See e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Barnes also
refers in her complaint and in her briefs to Yahoo’s ‘promise’ to remove the indecent profiles and
her reliance thereon to her detriment. We construe such references to allege a cause of action
under section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981).”).
164.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (1981).
165.
See Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 959 (E.D. Wis. 1999)
(“‘[T]he terms of the party who sent the last form, typically the seller, would become the terms of
the parties contract. This result was known as the “last shot rule.”’ Recognizing the growing
impracticality of such rules in the modern economy, the drafters of the UCC ‘change[d] the
common law in an attempt to conform contract law to modern day business transactions.’”
(citations omitted)), aff’d, 241 F.3d 915 (7th Cir. 2001).
166.
See O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512, 516 (M.D. La. 2003); i.Lan
Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 336-38 (D. Mass. 2002); see also
Barnes, supra note 114, at 239 (“[S]tandard form contracts signed by consumers pose problems
that are not present in traditional, heavily negotiated agreements between merchants. These
problems include the difference in bargaining strength between the parties to the contract, the
adhesive nature of the terms, and the problem of terms not being read by consumers.” (footnote
omitted)); Barnes, supra note 114, at 240 (“The consumer has no real choice in the matter of
whether the terms will be part of the contract or not, and the forms are all one-sided and
designed to benefit the drafting enterprise. The consumer is essentially put at the mercy of the
form-drafting business.” (footnote omitted)); Rühl, supra note 157, at 212-13 (“[I]t becomes
obvious that the last-shot rule, despite or because it provides a clear and strict rule . . . .
encourages an extensive exchange of standard forms because both [companies] know that the
other party's standard terms will control the complete transaction if the other party manages to
make the last offer.”).
167.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208; see also David Horton,
Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13, 13 (2011) (“The unconscionability
doctrine has emerged as the primary check on drafter overreaching.”).

576

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:3:545

the contract.168
But unconscionability is fairly strongly
circumscribed,169 especially after the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.170
Since software is often sold off the shelves in boxes, some
courts have applied Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2 to
e-commercial sales of software, even when the goods in question are in
fact licenses to use software products.171 And, of course, many online
transactions are simply sales of real goods over the Internet. Thus, for
cases involving sales of goods online, or retail sales of software, courts
often use UCC Article 2, which covers sales of goods. UCC 2-207, the
famed battle of the forms provision, resolves competing terms in the
parties’ offer and acceptance.172
UCC 2-207 offers a range of possible interpretations that
generate rules for contract formation. These interpretive rules in turn
determine which of a competing set of contract terms the court will
deem operative.173
As between businesses, some cases resolve
168.
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir.
1965); see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002).
169.
See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 156, at 1068-72.
170.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding that
California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable was pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the FAA’s goal of
enforcing arbitration clauses). AT&T had an arbitration clause in its mobile phone contract that
waived class action suits by consumers. The Concepcions, consumers who purchased the AT&T
plan in order to get the free phone, filed suit against AT&T alleging that AT&T fraudulently
charged them tax on the phone, because AT&T had stated in its advertisement that consumers
would get a free phone with the purchase of a plan. Under prior California precedent, waiver of
class arbitration in consumer contracts of adhesion was unconscionable in certain circumstances
and therefore unenforceable. In addition, the FAA did not preempt California’s state law
prohibition of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011);
see also Horton, supra note 167, at 14 (“Justice Thomas implies that nobody can apply
unconscionability to arbitration clauses. . . . Because Justice Thomas provided the swing vote in
Concepcion, and invited parties to address the link between §§ 2 and 4 in the future, he ensured
that unconscionability’s viability will become a flashpoint in the arbitration wars.” (footnotes
omitted)).
171.
Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 786
n.17 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
172.
See IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989, 992
(7th Cir. 2008) (“Terms in form contracts are routinely enforced under the UCC, unless a ‘battle
of the forms’ occurs . . . or the term would be unconscionable . . . .”).
173.
See PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer, LP v. Christy Refractories, LLC, 225 F.3d 974, 977 (8th
Cir. 2000) (“Applying Article 2 of the . . . (UCC), the district court held that, because . . .
acceptance was expressly conditional upon . . . assent to additional terms . . . no contract was
formed under UCC § 2–207(1). The district court alternatively determined that, even if . . .
customer acknowledgment was a valid acceptance under § 2–207(1), the provisions of § 2–207(2)
prevented incorporation of . . . added terms because the[re] . . . was a material alteration of the
contract. Finally, the district court held that the additional arbitration terms could not qualify as
a supplemental term under § 2–207(3) given the parties' limited course of dealing.” (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted)).
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differing terms in the offer and acceptance by merging non-conflicting
unimportant terms under 2-207(2).174 Other cases apply a judicial
gloss through the so-called “knockout rule” to eliminate differing
terms and fill any resulting gaps with commercial default rules.175 As
between a merchant and non-merchant, UCC 2-207(2), at least
technically, creates a “first shot rule,” which courts occasionally
interpret to favor consumers—who make the “first shot” by initiating
a purchase.176
More often, UCC 2-207(2) operates to favor
corporations as firing the “first shot”,177 since the corporate EULA or
Terms of Use are the first website terms that the user encounters.178
The real problem, though, lies not with whether courts enforce
corporate terms as the “first shot,” or enforce corporate terms as the
“last shot.” The issue is that a significant number of courts are
applying a de facto “only shot” rule.179 That is, by not recognizing or
174.
See, e.g., Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir.
2002) (“‘[T]he burden of proving the materiality of the alteration must fall on the party that
opposes inclusion.’ This is so because the UCC presumes that between merchants additional
terms will be included in a contract. Thus, ‘if neither party introduced any evidence, the
[proposed additional term] would, by the plain language of § 2-207(2), become part of the
contract.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
175.
See, e.g., SCM Grp., USA, Inc. v. Custom Designs & Mfg. Co., 89 F. App'x 779, 780
(3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Superior Court has issued an opinion in which it holds that
the ‘knockout rule’ applies to contracts governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. . . . As such, we hold
that neither the original terms nor the handwritten changes, which were obviously ‘different’ and
not simply ‘additional’ terms, control the issue of acceptance. Instead, we look to the U.C.C. to
supply the default terms of acceptance.” (citation omitted)).
176.
See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) (“In typical
consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the offeree.”); DeFontes v.
Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1067 (R.I. 2009) (“The U.C.C. creates the assumption that, unless
circumstances unambiguously demonstrate otherwise, the buyer is the offeror and the seller is
the offeree.”); see also Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 956 (E.D. Wis.
1999) (“[T]he purchase order usually is the first document having the legal attributes of an offer.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Gulf States Utils. Co. v. NEI Peebles Elec. Prods., Inc., 819 F.
Supp. 538, 549 (M.D. La. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted))), aff’d, 241 F.3d 915 (7th Cir.
2001).
177.
DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071 (“After reviewing the case law pertaining to so-called
‘shrinkwrap’ agreements, we are satisfied that the ProCD line of cases is better reasoned and
more consistent with contemporary consumer transactions. It is simply unreasonable to expect a
seller to apprise a consumer of every term and condition at the moment he or she makes a
purchase. . . . We therefore decline to adopt the minority view, as urged by plaintiffs, that a
contract is fully formed when a buyer orders a product and the seller accepts payment and either
ships or promises to ship. Instead, formation occurs when the consumer accepts the full terms
after receiving a reasonable opportunity to refuse them.” (emphasis added)).
178.
See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Each WoW player must read and accept Blizzard's End User License Agreement (‘EULA’) and
Terms of Use (‘ToU’) on multiple occasions. . . . The ToU pertains to the online service, so a
player agrees to it both when creating an account and upon first connecting to the online
service.”), amended by denial of reh’g, No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011).
179.
See DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1071 (“[W]e are satisfied that the ProCD line of cases is
better reasoned and more consistent with contemporary consumer transactions. . . . [F]ormation
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enforcing consumer expressions of preference as true contractual
terms, or by finding that the corporate version of the deal is the only
version,180 these courts avoid the transaction costs they believe
consumer-proffered contracts would present.181 Or, to the extent that
a court is sympathetic to consumer concerns, courts continue to try to
protect consumer interests by interpreting only the corporate contract
terms.182 In other words, whatever the test, the corporate terms
govern.
This tilted architecture is built upon the line of cases including
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg183 and Hill v. Gateway.184 These cases argue
that the consumer simply had not offered any contractual terms that
the court could consider—that, in essence, the corporation had fired
the “only shot.”185 Other courts widely follow the approach taken in
these two cases.186 Courts hold that consumers have not offered their
own terms, ostensibly because such terms were not in writing, and
because any writing would be superseded by the following corporate
contract that came with the shipped product.187

occurs when the consumer accepts the full terms after receiving a reasonable opportunity to
refuse them.”).
180.
Id.
181.
Id. (“It is simply unreasonable to expect a seller to apprise a consumer of every term
and condition at the moment he or she makes a purchase.”).
182.
See id.; see also Barnes, supra note 114, at 239-40; Horton, supra note 167; Knapp,
supra note 6.
183.
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Our case has only
one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant. . . . What then does the current version of the UCC have to
say? We think that the place to start is § 2-204(1): . . . . A vendor, as master of the offer, may
invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes
acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as
acceptance. And that is what happened.”).
184.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding ProCD to
be controlling, specifically the power to control the offer and set its terms). “Plaintiffs ask us to
limit ProCD to software, but where’s the sense in that? ProCD is about the law of contract, not
the law of software.” Id. at 1149.
185.
See id. at 1148-49; ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“A vendor, as master of the offer, may
invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes
acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as
acceptance.”). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (D. Kan. 2000) (“[T]he
Seventh Circuit provided no explanation for its conclusion that ‘the vendor is the master of the
offer.’ . . . In typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror, and the vendor is the
offeree.” (citations omitted)). In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook looked to UCC § 2-204(1) and
determined that contracts can be formed in a variety of ways, and having a splash screen was
one of them. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
186.
DeFontes, 984 A.2d at 1069-71 (“The defendants argue that ProCD represents the
majority view and we have found considerable support for their contention.”).
187.
See id. at 1069 (“[A]dopting ProCD analysis but noting shrinkwrap agreement
explicitly instructed consumers ‘IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THESE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS, PROMPTLY RETURN * * * TO THE PLACE OF PURCHASE AND YOUR
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Moreover, in the Hill and ProCD approach, courts often go to
significant lengths to reinterpret the moment of contract formation to
ensure that the corporate drafter is the “offeror,” and the consumer
accepts the corporate-proffered terms.188 In Hill v. Gateway, the court
determined that the consumer did not offer, in the legal sense, to buy
a computer when he called Gateway and ordered a computer.189 That
would have made the consumer’s terms govern, since Gateway
promptly accepted the offer by shipping the computer, as is permitted
under UCC 2-206.190 Indeed, under the “first shot” rule of 2-207(2),
had the court deemed the Hills the offerors, all additional terms to the
original agreement would be mere proposals for modification and not
part of the contract. But the court deemed that the Hills were not the
offerors, and also found that the parties did not form a contract even
when the computer arrived with the contract enclosed.191 Rather, the
court found that the Hills, by not returning the computer, accepted
Gateway’s contract terms nearly a month afterward.192 The idea that
there was no contract as of the point of the initial telephone order is
odd.193 The parties had agreed on a sale and a price,194 and would
have had a cause of action if one party had not performed.195 But
courts continue to shuffle offer and acceptance until they come to the
unfortunate result: the corporate contractual terms prevail.

PURCHASE PRICE WILL BE REFUNDED . . . .’” (citing M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 308 (Wash. 2000))).
188.
See id. at 1067-70. But see Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (“The Court is not
persuaded that Kansas or Missouri courts would follow the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Hill and
ProCD. In each case the Seventh Circuit concluded without support that UCC § 2-207 was
irrelevant because the cases involved only one written form.”).
189.
Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1150 (“The question in ProCD was not whether terms were
added to a contract after its formation, but how and when the contract was formed—in
particular, whether a vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or
over the phone) with the payment of money or a general ‘send me the product,’ but after the
customer has had a chance to inspect both the item and the term. . . . At oral argument the Hills
propounded still another distinction: the box containing ProCD’s software displayed a notice that
additional terms were within, while the box containing Gateway's computer did not. The
difference is functional, not legal.”).
190.
See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2003) (“[A]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or
current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods . . . .”).
191.
Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1148-50.
192.
Id. at 1150 (“By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s
offer . . . .”).
193.
See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
194.
See id. § 2-201 (establishing partial payment as grounds for satisfying the Statute of
Frauds).
195.
See id. § 2-206 (inviting acceptance of offer by any means, including shipping).

580

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:3:545

Despite this, consumers sometimes win contractual disputes
with corporations.196 But their victories only highlight the problem.
Because courts only look at corporate-drafted terms even when they
are attempting to protect consumer interests, consumer victories are
one-shot, flash-in-the-pan victories that merely cause the corporation
to rewrite its EULA or TOS to avoid the prior result in future cases. 197
Corporate victories such as Concepcion, however, are wide ranging
and permanent. When a court validates and enforces a corporate
term, like one barring class actions and requiring arbitration, other
corporations include those terms in their contracts and then courts
subsequently enforce those terms against more consumers.198 In this
way, consumer victories are limited to the individual case, while
corporate victories redound to the benefit of all corporate drafters.
Focusing on corporate-drafted contracts to protect consumer rights
does not provide sufficient protection to consumers.
This one-way ratchet only works, however, because consumers
cannot effectively contribute terms to their own online contracts.
They are merely permitted to choose which corporate-drafted contract
will bind them. When a consumer buys a product online, she selects
the product, and then the seller hands her a set of inalterable terms
and conditions. She may refuse to purchase, or may accept the terms.
She may not, however, add or change the terms or conditions. There
is no drop-down box for that.
Indeed, some courts may not enforce consumer-proffered terms
even if offered in writing and in the form of a contract. As noted
above, even if a court holds that a consumer had offered written
contractual terms, it can easily alter which terms are considered
definitive by changing who is the offeror and who is the acceptor in
favor of the corporation.199 Alternatively, a court may exclude
consumer terms under the parol evidence rule (if the consumer’s
communication of terms took place prior to, or contemporaneously
with, the transaction) or under anti-modification clause analysis (if
the communication of terms came after whichever moment the court
deems that the corporation’s contract excluding modification became
operative).200 In this way, the law excludes the consumer from the

196.
See also discussion supra note 185.
197.
See Budnitz, supra note 156, at 1172; Knapp, supra note 6.
198.
See Budnitz, supra note 156, at 1171-72; Knapp, supra note 6, at 117-18.
199.
See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069-71 (R.I. 2009); see also Budnitz,
supra note 156, at 1172.
200.
U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
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contracting process if she communicates her terms before, during, or
after the delivery of the corporate terms.201
A return to the basic contract principle that consumers may
offer contract terms could resolve deep difficulties in the law of online
contracting, and could have ramifications well beyond the original
“do-not-track” context. A thought experiment may help define how the
proposal of this Article departs from standard practice, and how much
of a difference a bit of consumer contracting could make. After
Concepcion, many believe that several forms of consumer class actions
face significant additional legal hurdles.202 Courts will hold that
consumers gave up their right to go to court because of
corporate-drafted and court-enforced arbitration clauses. Imagine,
however, that a consumer includes a full retention-of-rights clause in
her browser handshake protocol. That is, suppose that the consumer
communicated to the corporation, at the moment of their first online
interaction: “If you want to deal with me, you should know that I
reserve all rights and remedies, and specifically reject any arbitration
clause.” If courts were to enforce such a contractual term, the
non-trivial concerns raised by Concepcion would simply cease to
exist.203 Restoring power to the consumer to draft and offer contract
terms would do much to ameliorate the problem of consumer
powerlessness in online contracting.
Giving consumers power to proffer, and not merely accept
automated contract terms online is not a radical proposal. It is easy to
overlook that in the one place where corporations do permit consumers
to communicate contractual preference—the quantity term in an
online sales contract—the enforcement of that term is simply a matter
of course. The consumer gets the number of items she ordered.

201.
See Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1283, 1307 n.121 (2005) (“For contract claims, cases [where] . . . consumer's act of
breaking the shrinkwrap is deemed to be assent to the governing terms, form the foundation for
courts’ analysis. The trend among courts is to enforce such licenses, so long as the consumer has
a right to reject the terms by returning the product.”). “[C]ourts . . . have broadly construed
license agreements in favor of licensors – even when it is questionable whether the licensee has
manifested assent to particular notices provided by the licensor.” Id. at 1306-07.
202.
See Ashby Jones, After AT&T Ruling, Should We Say Goodbye to Consumer Class
Actions?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/27/
after-att-ruling-should-we-say-goodbye-to-consumer-class-actions (noting that class action suits
are threatened by the result in Concepcion).
203.
See Horton, supra note 167 (“The unconscionability doctrine has emerged as the
primary check on drafter overreaching.”); Knapp, supra note 6; see also Stephen E. Friedman, A
Pro-Congress Approach to Arbitration and Unconscionability, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 53,
54-57 (2011) (“This Essay . . . responds to some of Professor Horton’s objections to my
position. . . . Concepcion invites us to ask whether unconscionability really is within § 2 at all.
That is, rather than put unconscionability into a tiny cage in which it can barely move, why not
put it out of its misery altogether in the context of arbitration provisions . . . .”).
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Outside of the consumer context, courts routinely give legal effect to
buyer-side machine-automated contract terms.204 When a computer in
a business-to-business transaction orders a product—for example in
the extremely common practice of Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI)—the buyer and seller have usually worked out the terms and
conditions in advance as part of an overall EDI agreement.205
Machines make the contracts, and the terms of the purchasing
machine’s contract are as binding upon the seller as the terms of the
selling machine’s contract are upon the buyer.206
Likewise, when one website wishes to exclude robots and
scrapers from its service, the website posts a file called “robots.txt”
that includes the restrictions on scraping.207 These restrictions are
readable by other people’s scrapers and agents, and are quite binding:
if the scraper continues despite the preferences expressed in the
robots.txt file, courts have analogized the resulting server load to
trespassing on someone’s land without permission.208
Thus,
automated contracts are enforced. Buyer-side contracts are enforced.
Buyer-side automated contracts are enforced. But consumer buyerside automated contracts—such as a contractual do-not-track term
included in a browser—are often either ignored or swept under the rug
as not comprising part of the contract.
A critical question to answer is why courts disfavor consumer
contract terms in the online context. First, courts may be crudely
attempting to streamline online contracting, or at least to simplify
their work in construing online contracts. Courts like corporate
contracts. Corporations draft contracts in legal language, in a format
that the court recognizes, and with strong mechanisms of acceptance,
like clicking an “I Accept” button, or scrolling to the bottom of the legal
document. Thus, in order to keep things simple, courts have turned to
204.
See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107(a) (2002); see also Baney Corp.
v. Agilysys NV, LLC, 773 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (D. Md. 2011) (“Maryland law governs
interpretation of the contracts at issue in this case. The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (“UCITA”) has been enacted by the Maryland legislature and both contracts are
covered by its terms.” (citations omitted)); KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., No.
CV 06-3013(JS)(AKT), 2006 WL 1720461, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2006) (“[T]he Service
Agreement for Electronic Fund Transfers dated July 11, 1998, and the Key Exchange Services
Amendment Agreement dated December 10, 2004 (collectively the ‘Agreements’) clearly define
the rights and duties of the parties.”).
205.
See Keybank, 2006 WL 1720461, at *4.
206.
See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107(a).
207.
See Zittrain, supra note 24, at 100-03.
208.
See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(“eBay argues that BE's use was unauthorized and intentional. eBay is correct. BE does not
dispute that it employed an automated computer program to connect with and search eBay's
electronic database. . . . BE argues that it cannot trespass eBay's web site because the site is
publicly accessible. BE's argument is unconvincing.”).
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corporate contracts as the sole expression of contractual preferences
within an e-commercial case.209 A consumer’s preferences are rarely
so cleanly stated. They might consist of statements made during the
purchasing process, or even tacit understandings of the parties.
While in each individual case it may be simpler to enforce the
corporate terms, the aggregate effect of this practice is to shift large
transaction costs onto consumers. While a judge must read only one
contract in a case, the result of the corporate-contract-focused
interpretive approach is that privacy-minded consumers must read
thousands of different online contracts drafted in extremely technical
language.210 And if, as this Article suggests, there is a way to create
compact, streamlined consumer-offered contract terms—such as a
“do-not-track” flag set in a browser—the court’s judicial economy
preference for corporate-drafted contracts should give way to a more
even-handed approach.
Some contracts that the law calls “standardized” are in fact
obfuscatory.211
Other “standardized” contracts are truly
standardized—that is, they convey more information to the user by
virtue of the fact that they offer the standard deal.212 For this latter
kind of standardized contract, the consumer need not read the
contract in every case, since she knows she is getting the standard
deal. True standardization helps convey information.213 What courts
dislike are not true standard contracts, but precisely those contracts
that are not standardized—that is, that contain some term or
condition that would unfairly surprise the consumer.214
However, even courts that understand that standardized
contracts can reduce information costs215 have, not without irony,

209.
See Barnes, supra note 114, at 245-46 (“Under the duty-to-read rule, if a consumer
signs a form contract, the law has traditionally stated that it is reasonable for the merchant to
conclude that the consumer has thereby given her assent to the deal.”).
210.
See Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1642 (“It has become a truism that virtually no one
reads standard-form online agreements.”); Nehf, supra note 144 (“[D]espite the proliferation of
privacy policies online, consumers’ privacy interests may in fact be no better protected today
than they were ten years ago.”).
211.
See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1237,
1273 (2007).
212.
Id. at 1244.
213.
Cf. Eric J. Feigin, Note, Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and
Their Legal Implications, 56 STAN. L. REV. 901, 902 (2004) (“Higher-level protocols, such as those
utilized in most web interactions, involve exchanges that should be considered express consent:
the formation of a legally binding contract.”).
214.
See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1450 (2009).
215.
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Writing
provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions. Customers as a group are better off
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refused to take the last step of enforcing consumer-side standard
terms. Automated contracts have been around for years,216 and while
courts continue wrestling with the problems raised by the
mid-nineties automation of corporate-side contracting over the
Internet, commerce has already moved on to new frontiers.217 As
noted above, one of the inalterable features of this new commercial
landscape is that computers automatically offer and accept
contracts.218 Automated contracting is the backbone of modern
commercial systems, from machine parts to groceries to vast swaths of
financial markets.
Transaction costs would be at their lowest if both consumers
and corporations could offer standard contracts automatically,
whether through the consumer’s web browser or the corporation’s web
server.
Corporations benefit from legal enforcement of their
web-server-proffered contracts. When a consumer purchases an item
from Amazon.com, she does not interact with a live person. The
machine is the agent or instrumentality of the corporate contractual
counterparty.219 In exactly the same fashion, consumers should
benefit from legal enforcement of their web-browser-proffered
contracts. It is neither complex nor costly for corporations to refuse to
do business with customers who offer contractual terms the
corporation does not wish to accept. Of course, what will likely
happen is the opposite: the corporation will choose to do business with
the consumer,220 and in so doing, a court should deem that the
when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use instead a
simple approve-or-return device.”).
216.
Cf. Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting
Toward a Global Environment, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 31, 31 (1992) (“With the growth in the
use of electronic communications technologies to communicate important business and trade
information, the size of the earth . . . is rapidly shrinking.”).
217.
Id. at 31-32 (“[T]he drafting . . . of several international codifications . . . . though
progressive, ha[s] failed to keep pace with the quickly changing face of international business
transactions.”).
218.
Id. at 33 (“Companies are increasingly resorting to electronic communications
technologies like electronic data interchange (EDI) because of the increased speed of
transmission, reduction in error in commercial exchanges of data, reduced need for paper
documents, elimination of repetitive computer input, reduced inventory needs, faster response to
business demand, reduced time to market products, and significant overall cost reductions.”).
219.
Of course, the programmer who set the machine up, or her superiors who told her
what to code, are the real legal counterparties, but that does not matter for this analysis.
220.
See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 275-78 (2011) (discussing the rise in privacy concerns by
consumers and the media, and the change in policies by corporations to address this demand);
Doug Gross, Apple: Apps Need ‘Explicit Approval’ Before Collecting User Contacts, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/tech/mobile/apple-user-contacts/index.html (last updated Feb. 22,
2012) (“Apple on Wednesday said it will start requiring mobile apps to get explicit permission
from iPhone and iPad owners before the apps collect and store information about users' personal
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corporation accepted the consumer’s terms. The next Section explores
the potential of deeming automated consumer-side terms enforceable.
B. A Better Direction: Consumer Online Contracts
Courts should apply the same rules to enforce consumer-offered
online contract terms as they do to enforce corporate-offered terms.
Consumer privacy preferences would, under this approach, be
expressed as standardized, simple, machine-readable settings set in
the web browser client. This solution is at least as good as, and likely
far better than, the practice of corporations offering lengthy and
obfuscatory contracts via their web servers.
An enforceable
do-not-track flag is a perfect place to start. It is an absolutely clear
expression of the consumer’s unwillingness to sell her private
information, offered at the first and every subsequent point of contact
between consumer and corporation. While comprehension costs to
consumers of reading and keeping up with thousands of corporate
contracts are very high, comprehension costs to corporations of
complying with a simple and binary machine-readable flag are
absolutely zero. Corporations can set their web servers to respond to
the flag and respect the consumer’s preference, or choose not do
business with her, as the corporation chooses.
The proposal advanced here is not a vision of individuated,
dickered, or particularized consumer contracting, but rather a vision
of standardized, mass-market, consumer-proffered contract terms.
This is an approach with a successful track record. For example, in
the intellectual property context, consumers can use Creative
Commons copyright licenses (CC licenses) for content that they create
and upload to online sites.221 CC licenses give content creators control
of their work in the form of short, clear, and standardized license
terms.222 The result is a copyright system that is characterized by
simplicity, low transaction costs, and equalization in legal power for

contacts. . . . The statement came after a week of revelations that popular social tools like
Twitter and Path were doing just that . . . .”).
221.
See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses
(last visited Aug. 15, 2011) [hereinafter CREATIVE COMMONS] (providing for a standard option set
of contractual licenses that have revolutionized online exchanges). For example, an aspiring web
developer may pick a Creative Commons (CC) license that allows others, including corporations,
to use their work but only for non-commercial use and with attribution, or freely with only
attribution required.
222.
See Severine Dusollier, Contract Options for Individual Artists: Master’s Tools v.
The Master’s House: Creative Commons v. Copyright, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 271, 272 (2006)
(discussing the purpose of Creative Commons to address the over expansion of copyright and
need to protect both future creators and users of copyrighted works).
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consumers with corporations through simple contracts223 that courts
will enforce.224 And to the extent that a consumer-proffered contract
contains a non-standard or non-machine-readable surprise, courts can
strike unconscionable terms from the contract on the same grounds
and to the same extent that they do (or equally often do not) for
unfairly surprising terms in corporate contracts. But in this case,
there can be no surprise in a single check box indicating that a
consumer does not wish to be tracked.
Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the contract terms
that consumers offer will be simple and standardized. Consumers
often merely expect the standard deal, which involves price, quantity,
and standard quality. Consumers do not need or want most of the fine
legal technicalities that corporations do; they desire only essential
terms.
Underneath the basic inclination of consumers to add a breath
of needed simplicity to legal transactions lies a deeper point.
Consumer-side contracts can be crafted to be not only simple but also
modular and standardized. A good model here again is the CC
licenses.225 CC users select pre-drafted standardized licenses that
govern the use of their content through a simple menu of options.226
The licenses respond to user desires and do not add needless
boilerplate.
Finally, the licenses are undoubtedly enforceable
consumer contracts offered by and responsive to the needs of the
individual rather than the corporation.227
Other scholars have proposed to use CC licensing as a broader
solution to the problem of consumer data privacy.228 This Article does
not propose so broad an initiative here. Rather, it notes that browsers
currently permit a user to express her preference to not be tracked.229
This option is simple, binary, and machine-readable. There is no
reason, other than willful ignorance, for a company to track a user
who has made use of such a browser option. Certainly, the argument
that consumer-proffered contracts will complicate online contracting

223.
See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 720-21, n.224 (2010) (“The Creative
Commons . . . licenses are legally enforceable in both contract and property.”).
224.
Id. at n.224.
225.
See CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 221.
226.
See id.
227.
See Dusollier, supra note 222 at 272.
228.
See Patricia Sánchez Abril, supra note 223, at 720-23 (2010).
229.
See Wingfield & Angwin, supra note 153; see also Ryan Singel, Google Holds Out
Against ‘Do Not Track,’ CNN (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/04/18/google.
chrome.wired/index.html; Mozilla: Do Not Track, supra note 153 (noting that Mozilla Firefox
includes a Do-Not-Track option).
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fails in the face of such a simple and standard expression of
preference.
III. THE DO-NOT-TRACK OPTION
A. The FTC’s Proposal
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), sensing the
inadequacies of the current legal framework, has voiced some support
for a federally enforced do-not-track option.230 The FTC has already
had broad success with an analogous program: the Federal
Do-Not-Call Registry.231
This list helped to curb direct-call
harassment by call centers because it permitted consumers to make a
simple, one-time, enforceable election to not be contacted.232
Companies reliant on unchecked use of consumer information
have broadly opposed the FTC’s proposal of a do-not-track
enforcement regime,233 just as telemarketers resisted the Do-Not-Call
list. 234 Whether these lobbying efforts will succeed remains an open
question. It is certainly true that a FTC-mandated do-not-track option
should not be run in the same fashion as the Do-Not-Call list.
The Federal Do-Not-Call list requires users to register their
telephone numbers with the government.235 The government then
maintains this central registry and telemarketers must scrub their
contact lists by comparison to the central database on a regular
230.
See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, F.T.C. Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online
Users, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/02/business/media/02privacy.
html.
231.
See Nils Kongshaug, Do-Not-Call List a Success . . . Even for Telemarketers, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Business/story?id=1037365.
232.
See Reporter Resources: The National Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/dnc.shtm (last visited October 2, 2011) [hereinafter
National DNC Registry] (describing the role and certain limitations of the Do Not Call Registry).
233.
See David Goldman, FTC ‘Do Not Track’ Plan Would Cripple Some Web Giants,
CNNMONEY (Dec. 3, 2010, 10:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/12/02/technology/ftc_do_not_
track/index.htm (identifying numerous industry leaders, for example Google, who are opposed to
“do not track” because of unforeseen security problems and loss of advertising revenues). But see
Casey Newton, Google Agrees to Do-Not-Track Button, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2012,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/23/BULK1NBLSQ.DTL&type=tech
(“Google . . . became the latest Internet giant to support adding a do-not-track button to its web
browser. No time frame was set for changing the Chrome browser to include a do-not-track
feature . . . .”); Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Emily Steel, White House to Push Privacy Bill,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870466260457
6202971768984598.html (“[A] group of about 30 online-advertising companies is preparing to
break with most of the industry and support a proposal for a single do-not-track tool.”).
234.
See Do-Not-Call Back on the Line, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:36 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/07/tech/main561876.shtml (describing industry efforts
to stop the Do Not Call list).
235.
See National DNC Registry, supra note 232.
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basis.236 A do-not-track option could not work in the same way, nor
should it. The “telephone number” at issue could be one of two
options, both of which present difficulties. The identifying number
could be a special government-issued cookie that identified the user237
or it could be the user’s IP address.238 The IP address option will not
work, since most ISPs assign IP addresses on a dynamic basis,
changing any given user’s IP address regularly. And those ISPs that
allocate static IP addresses, such as Sprint,239 create enormous
tracking problems for consumers.240 The government cookie option
raises even more concern, because in order to not be tracked by
corporations, the user must reveal herself in a permanent fashion to
the government.241 One option is unworkable, the other unacceptable.
B. A Better Alternative: Do-Not-Track Browser-Level Options
The simple expedient of enforcing a browser-level do-not-track
option would solve the above-mentioned problems. A do-not-track
option in the browser does not rely on an IP address, since the user
can express her preference not to be tracked no matter what Internet
address she is using.242 And it does not raise issues of government
intrusion into privacy, since the government would not have to
maintain a central database of special tracking cookies ostensibly used
to tell corporations not to track consumers.243
236.
Id.
237.
See Tracking the Trackers: Our Method, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703977004575393121635952084.html (“HTML
cookies are small text files, installed on a user's computer by a website, that assign the user's
computer a unique identity and can track the user's movements on a site.”).
238.
See Keith Black, Note, Technical Knockout: How Mixed Martial Arts Will Change
Copyright Enforcement on the Web, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 739, 755 n.106
(2011) (“An IP address is a unique user-identification number that is automatically assigned to
the user.”).
239.
See supra text accompanying note 109.
240.
See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 50 n.80 (2003) (“A
dynamic IP address is analogous to a ‘temporary phone number[,] for the duration of that
Internet session or for some other specified amount of time. Once the user disconnects from the
Internet, their [sic] dynamic IP address goes back into the IP address pool so it can be assigned
to another user.’” (alterations in original)).
241.
See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Signet Classic 1977) (1949) (describing a
fictional era in which the government watches and regulates one’s every action).
242.
See, e.g., Mozilla: Do Not Track, supra note 153 (instructing users how to enable Do
Not Track).
243.
This is because the user and the website would handle the do-not-track option: the
government would have no direct role. Compare id. (discussing how a user can enable Do Not
Track in her browser), with National DNC Registry, supra note 232 (illustrating how the FTC
operates its do-not-call registry by compiling and maintaining registered telephone numbers and
reporting the numbers to telemarketing companies).
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A simple and successful approach would be for the FTC to use
its section 5 authority to stop unfair business practices.244 This would
require businesses to respect a consumer’s expressed preference not to
be tracked.245 As is too often the case in politics, however, what
should be done may not be done. And even if the FTC were to adopt
do-not-track as an enforceable rule, the FTC has few resources
available for direct enforcement.246 An individual’s ability to stop
corporate surveillance therefore may depend on the availability of
other enforceable rights, such as those proposed here.
Furthermore, the FTC’s section 5 authority is restricted to
unfair business practices.247 Courts have read this authority quite
broadly.248 Nevertheless, corporations will certainly assert that
following the terms of their own privacy policies and terms of use does
not constitute an unfair business practice.249 From the corporation’s
perspective, the consumer has agreed to unlimited intrusion and
untrammeled surveillance merely by using an online site or service.
Changing the law’s default preference for corporate contracts is
important250 because the FTC has traditionally been much more
willing to step in on behalf of consumers when a company violates
244.
See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006) (granting the FTC the
power to regulate unfair trade practices); see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm (last updated July 2008) [hereinafter FTC: A Brief
Overview] (describing the FTC’s authority under section 5 of the FTCA).
245.
FTC: A Brief Overview, supra note 244.
246.
See id. (“[E]ven where the Commission determines through adjudication or
rulemaking that a practice is unfair or deceptive, the Commission must still seek the aid of a
court to obtain civil penalties or consumer redress for violations of its orders to cease and desist
or trade regulation rules.”); see also Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 220.
247.
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful.”).
248.
See FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (“Congress, in 1914, enacted the Federal Trade Commission Act. The then broad purpose
of the Act was to prevent unfair methods of competition in their inception. By the Wheeler-Lea
amendment, Congress, in 1938, broadened section 5 of the Act and extended the authority of the
Commission to eliminate unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce without regard to
competition.” (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted)).
249.
See Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862-865 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(“Unfair acts are those that ‘offend[] an established public policy’ or are ‘immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.’ . . . [D]efendant . . .
argued . . . plaintiff’s contractual claims should be dismissed because the provisions of the
privacy policy maintained by defendant expressly provide that no liability will result due to a
third party's unauthorized access of defendant's computer system . . . .” (alteration in original));
see also Adam R. Bialek & Scott M. Smedresman, Internet Risk Management: A Guide to
Limiting Risk Through Web Site Terms and Proactive Enforcement, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J. 1 (2008) (describing how privacy policies and terms of use statements can limit risks to
companies that operate websites).
250.
See Kesan & Shah, supra note 45.
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contractual promises with consumers.251 Since corporations rarely
make enforceable promises regarding consumer privacy, FTC
involvement in consumer privacy has been anemic.252
There is, however, a potential upside to this dynamic. If courts
enforce consumer-offered automated standardized contract terms,
then companies will indeed be violating the promises they have made
to consumers if they violate a do-not-track term. If corporations
violate an actual contractual promise regarding privacy, the FTC will
have more opportunity to become legally involved. What was once a
rarity may become commonplace; the FTC will actually protect
consumers from corporate overreach.253
Indeed, the FTC does step in where corporate transactions
violate actual contractual promises made to consumers regarding
privacy. In F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, LLC, the FTC stepped in to
prevent the sale of consumer information as part of a bankruptcy
proceeding, where the debtor entity had promised its consumers not to
sell or share customer information.254 Toysmart.com was, typical of
modern pro-consumer contract cases, a mere flash in the pan. The
industry standard clauses regarding resale of consumer information
were promptly rewritten to permit ad infinitum resale of consumer
information.255
But again, it is worth noting that enforcing
consumer-proffered contract terms will help to correct for the one-way
ratchet that current online contracting trends have established. It is
quite possible, therefore, that if courts permit robust consumerproffered contracting, then the FTC will see violations of those
contract terms as grounds to intervene under its section 5 authority to
sanction unfair business practices.
251.
See e.g., FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, No. Civ.A. 00-CV11341RGS, 2000 WL 1523287
(D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000) (alleging that Toysmart violated the terms of its privacy policy with
consumers about disclosure of personal information and therefore engaged in deceptive acts or
practices in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act); see also In re Gateway
Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443 (2004).
252.
See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 220, at 302 (“[T]his turn to objective
manifestations of privacy embodied in social norms has been used by the FTC to protect privacy
where technological changes render traditional reliance on consent inoperative, or at least
incomplete.”). The article continues by discussing the problem of the FTC’s roving enforcement
and inconsistency on privacy concerns for consumers and how this has been significant. Id.
253.
Id. at 314-15 (“Finally, as the privacy community reflects upon the key global
instruments of data protection, our account underscores the importance of empirical inquiry and
thick institutional engagement in considering contested issues of regulatory strategy,
technological complexity, social and institutional networks, and the protection of individual and
communal interests in the private sphere. If privacy is to be protected in an increasingly
connected world, debates over its formal regulation must increasingly be informed by the ways
that today's frameworks operate on the ground.”).
254.
See id.
255.
See Richard A. Beckmann, Comment, Privacy Policies And Empty Promises: Closing
The “Toysmart Loophole,” 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 765, 788 n.159-60.
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Establishing a do-not-track option as a consumer-side
contractual term that corporations must respect would, at a minimum,
accomplish two things. First, it would return control over contractual
relations to consumers.256 Second, it would establish that companies
are systematically breaking their contractual promises to consumers
when they track those consumers despite an expressed preference
against tracking. Such a systematic breach of relations between
corporation and consumer would lay a more solid groundwork for FTC
intervention. 257
C. On Geese and Gander: Why Favor Corporate Interests?
This Section will argue that corporations and consumers
should have equal power to offer enforceable contract terms. It will
then provide several examples of other areas in the law where this
kind of equalization has been successful. The most successful
movements in Web 2.0258 have turned the tables on corporations by
relying on courts’ basic intuitions of fairness.259 The developed and
powerful law of intellectual property that corporations built over the
past two decades was put at consumers’ fingertips through the CC
licenses.260
This Article promotes a similar proposal for data
protection: that the developed law of online contracting, which until
256.
See Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1638 (“Code-based negotiations for confidentiality can
form implied-in-fact contracts or give rise to a claim for promissory estoppel.”).
257.
See FTC: A Brief Overview, supra note 244 (describing the FTC’s authority to
regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices). For an example of the FTC’s willingness to
intervene in consumer privacy cases where there is a violation of the contractual promises
between corporation and consumer, see Press Release, FTC, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy
Practices in Google’s Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network: Google Agrees to Implement
Comprehensive Privacy Program to Protect Consumer Data (Mar. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm (“The FTC complaint charges that Google violated its
privacy policies . . . .”).
258.
See Matthew J. Wilson, E-Elections: Time for Japan to Embrace Online
Campaigning, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, 1 (“Internet users spend significant time using ‘Web
2.0’ technologies and other World Wide Web tools (collectively ‘Internet tools’) that enable
interactive information sharing, user-centered design, collaboration, and a compilation of
collective intelligence.”).
259.
E.g., Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (Rahmeyer, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he same contract principles hold on the Internet. When the consumer is
presented with a contract of adhesion containing lengthy provisions and hidden terms, I believe
courts should consider whether the process of assent or terms of the contract are
unconscionable.”).
260.
See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Oct.
8, 2011) (“[The creative commons system] give[s] everyone from individual creators to large
companies and institutions a simple, standardized way to keep their copyright while allowing
certain uses of their work—a ‘some rights reserved’ approach to copyright—which makes their
creative, educational, and scientific content instantly more compatible with the full potential of
the [I]nternet.”).
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now has served only corporate interests, be put to use by protecting
consumers.261
The project falls apart, however, if courts are not willing to
grant the same contract power to consumers that they do to
corporations. They could refuse to do so through a range of options, as
noted above.262 For example, courts could deny the existence of the
consumer-proffered terms, as in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.263 Under
Hill and its progeny, courts acted as though consumers’ preferences
simply did not exist, or had no validity because they were not
contained within the corporate document.264
Indeed, of all of the challenges to the current proposal, this is
the most dangerous. When courts simply will not consider consumer
preferences to be part of “the” contract between the parties because
they are not expressed within the four corners of the corporate
contract, these courts destroy any hope of consumers protecting their
personal privacy.265 This is an even more untoward extension of the
preferences courts have already extended to corporations in the online
contracting arena. Under modern contract case law, consumers may
not offer contract terms or expect courts to enforce those terms.
Furthermore, courts do not even consider consumer preferences unless
they appear in the corporate contract.266 Imagine the counterfactual:
courts would ignore corporate contractual preferences unless they
appeared in the consumer’s data-use terms. If what were good for the
consumer goose were good for the corporate gander, all corporate
online contracts would have no effect, just as consumer terms are now
ignored.
If courts are legally rigorous and have not lost their sense of
fair play, then they will recognize consumer contractual terms and
should reach some form of accommodation. That might mean
cancelling the entire contract based on a lack of meeting of the
minds.267 More likely, it may be some form of “last shot” analysis that
may continue to favor corporations as long as courts continue to treat
261.
See LESSIG, supra note 30, at 228-30 (arguing for a contractual model to protect
privacy).
262.
See supra Part III.A-B.
263.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining how
there is no battle-of-the-forms situation when consumers purchase items with contracts
attached, and that such contracts are binding on both sellers and purchasers).
264.
See id. at 1148 (“Terms inside Gateway’s box stand or fall together. If they
constitute the parties’ contract because the Hills had an opportunity to return the computer after
reading them, then all must be enforced.”).
265.
See Knapp, supra note 6, at 102-04; see also Hartzog, supra note 3, at 1635-36.
266.
See, e.g., Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149-50.
267.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981) (citing cases in which an
absence of a meeting of the minds led to unenforceability of a contract).
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keeping the product as signifying assent—the last action. However, a
“last shot” analysis can also favor the consumer by, for example,
treating the corporation’s acceptance of payment or failure to recall
the product as actions that accept the consumer’s terms.268
Ideally, courts should give effect to each party’s preferences as
expressed in automated machine-offered terms that are readable by
the counterparty, insofar as they are not considered absolutely
contrary to each other. And when they directly contradict—that is,
when the corporation wishes to track an individual who has expressed
the clear and simple wish not to be tracked—then the court should
find that the parties have not reached a deal. No deal means no
tracking, on pain of violation of hacking laws, or liability for cyber
trespass, or other background default laws and rules.
The final vision here is one of computer-mediated automated
contracting between consumer and corporation. Consumers would
offer to sell their information based on standardized terms,
represented by check boxes in their browsers. ISPs and online service
providers would code their preferences for information purchases into
their web servers. Computers would perform a match. If the match is
exact, the contract contains the terms, both consumer check box and
corporate-drafted, that both parties have agreed to. If the terms are
such that the parties do not substantially agree, and they do not do
business with each other (because the corporate server refuses the
consumer’s connection) then there is still no tracking problem. If the
corporation accepts the consumer’s connection with full understanding
of the consumer’s expressed privacy preference, then the corporation
must respect that preference under two theories—either the
corporation would be deemed to have accepted the consumer’s
preferences by accepting the communication, or the differences
between the two would be so irreconcilable that any court would find
there was effectively no contract. This would, of course, lead to a
no-tracking result, since a result of no deal means the corporation did
not secure the consumer’s consent to tracking.

268.
Cf. Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986)
(discussing how § 2-207 of the UCC was created in part to do away with the common law’s “last
shot” rule of contract formation). According to the “last shot” rule, “the offeree/counterofferor gets
all of its terms simply because it fired the last shot in the exchange of forms.” Id.
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D. Is there a Remedy?
After AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,269 there is one
remaining caveat to the implementation of consumer do-not-track
preferences as contract terms. Assuming the consumer prevails, what
would the remedy be? Class actions in consumer mass-market
contracting have decreased after Concepcion,270 and privacy class
actions have fared particularly poorly in the courts.271 How does a
theory of do-not-track as contract alter this dynamic?
Without offering a deep discourse on the availability of
remedies in consumer e-commercial contracts, especially since courts
render most remedies moribund by enforcing corporate-drafted
limitations of remedies clauses, this Article offers some limited
suggestions. First, the consumer often wants the ISP to take some
action, such as taking down defamatory or embarrassing content, or in
the case of a privacy-conscious consumer, requiring the corporation to
delete the data.272
Specific performance—requiring a company to delete a
consumer’s data that it has extra-contractually gathered—seems a
simple, straightforward, and reasonable remedy. Remedies at law
(damages) do not solve the plaintiff’s problem of data remaining
outside her control. Thus, under the standard test for specific
performance, damages are inadequate, and specific performance is not
a particularly difficult remedy to obtain.273 The UCC encourages
liberal use of specific performance.274 And outside of the UCC, the
inadequacy of legal damages should lead courts to order Internet or

269.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (upholding the
Federal Arbitration Act against a judicial rule that would require class arbitration despite
contractual waivers).
270.
See id. at 1746 (holding that California’s Discover Bank rule—which holds that class
waivers are unconscionable when found in a contract of adhesion—is an obstacle to
Congressional objectives in the FAA and therefore preempted); see also Jones, supra note 202
(noting how the Concepcion decision may threaten the viability of class-action suits in the
future).
271.
See Ian C. Ballon & Wendy Mantell, Cloud Litigation: Suing Over Data Privacy and
Behavioral Advertising, CENTURY CITY LAW., Sept. 2011, available at http://centurycitybar.
com/newslettertemplate/Sept11/article2.htm (“Courts have dismissed putative privacy class
action suits where consent was inferred from a TOU agreement or a Privacy Policy.”).
272.
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 28-29, White v. Clearspring Techs., Inc., No.
2:2010-cv-05948 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010), ECF No. 27 (demanding, in part, relief in the form of
deleting consumer data collected in the forms complained of).
273.
See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A
Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1205 (2011) (“It is
commonly said that specific performance is available only when damages are ‘inadequate.’”).
274.
See U.C.C. § 2-716 (2003) (“Specific performance may be decreed if the goods are
unique or in other proper circumstances.”).
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online service providers that breach consumer’s contractual
conditions, to delete the data.
As noted above, consumer-offered contract terms may also have
some impact on a particular method for legal adjudication of small
harms—the class action. After Concepcion, it appears that Internet
class actions face significant additional legal hurdles from the
prevalence and enforcement of arbitration clauses that preclude class
treatment.275 But, for Concepcion to apply, the arbitration clause in
the corporate contract must be the operative legal clause.276 Courts
will enforce corporate rights and remedies limitations only if they
ignore consumer contractual language retaining all legal rights and
remedies—specifically including the right to a court trial. If courts
permit a consumer contracting approach, the consumer may include a
no-arbitration clause alongside her do-not-track option. Once courts
permit consumers to draft contracts rather than merely sign them,
these consumers can better defend their legal rights.
E. Corporate Objections to the Do-Not-Track Proposal
Consumer machine-mediated contracting is as valid and
enforceable as corporate machine-mediated contracting. Despite the
simplicity and limited scope of the do-not-track proposal, it will
certainly draw significant corporate objections. This Section seeks to
anticipate and answer some of the likely objections.
First, corporations will claim that they lack notice of
consumer-proffered contract terms. But courts have already rejected
the argument that consumers lacked notice of the contents of
corporate machine-mediated contracts.277 If consumers have notice of
corporate terms buried in prolix EULAs, corporations certainly would
have notice of simple, machine-readable flags set in a consumer’s
browser.

275.
See Jones, supra note 202 (noting that the Concepcion result threatens class action
suits).
276.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742-43 (2011) (“Section 2’s
saving clause permits agreements to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses,’
but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”).
277.
See, e.g., Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., No. C-09-5443 EDL, 2011 WL
3419499, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (“Plaintiff’s argument that she was not provided with
sufficient notice of the contractual terms she was assenting to because of Zynga’s modified
clickwrap presentation, and therefore is not bound by any arbitration provision, fails in light of
recent caselaw holding that clickwrap presentations providing a user with access to the terms of
service and requiring a user to affirmatively accept the terms, even if the terms are not
presented on the same page as the acceptance button, are sufficient.”).
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Corporations might also claim that they did not have any
power to object to consumer-proffered contracts.
Again, courts
rejected the argument that consumers had no choice but to accede to
the terms of corporate machine-mediated contracts.278 Unless courts
are willing to embrace a jurisprudence of pure corporate preference,
corporations should be held to the same standards when they agree to
consumer terms as consumers are when they agree to corporate terms.
Only procedural unfairness leading to a substantively unconscionable
result would permit the corporation to escape from its promises.279
And it is quite hard—almost laughable—to imagine a corporation
legitimately arguing that a consumer had so much market power that
it forced the corporation to agree to substantively unfair terms.
Moreover, the term at issue here—consumer privacy as expressed in a
do-not-track flag—is not substantively unfair.
The strongest objection is that courts should enforce the
corporation’s version of the contract rather than the consumer’s
version. Some variation of the four corners or parol evidence doctrine
may convince courts to continue ignoring consumers’ contractual
preferences.280 But if courts follow black-letter contract law, the buyer
is the master of the offer and the seller may agree to the buyer’s terms
or refuse the transaction.281 Courts should not manipulate the
moment of offer and counteroffer until the corporation’s terms
mysteriously come out as the enforced terms.282
A do-not-track option should be a core part of any data
transaction. It is expressed up front in machine-readable format. The
corporation knows what the deal is in crystal clear terms. So, as noted
above, if the corporation does not wish to do business with customers
who do not want to be tracked, it is free to refuse the connection at
that first point of contact. Nothing could be simpler. When courts

278.
Id.
279.
See Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010) (“As required to
make out a claim of unconscionability under Nevada law, he contended that the Agreement was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” (citation omitted)); Harrington v. Atl.
Sounding Co., 602 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1054 (2011) (“The district
court found that the facts of this case satisfied New Jersey’s ‘sliding scale’ approach to
unconscionability, under which ‘a claim of unconscionability can succeed when one form of it,
either procedural or substantive, is greatly exceeded, while the other form is only marginally
exceeded.’”).
280.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1856 (West 2011) (describing California’s parol evidence
rule).
281.
See U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (2003); see also discussion supra note 185.
282.
See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069-71 (R.I. 2009); see also Budnitz,
supra note 156.
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attempt to complicate matters, it looks suspiciously like naked
corporate preference.283
Another possible objection is that automated consumer
contractual preferences more complicated than do-not-track will place
an impermissible burden on corporations to read the contracts that
they enter into with their consumers.284 This burden did not
particularly bother corporations when customers had to track
hundreds of privacy policies from many different institutions.
But herein lies the larger point: to reduce information costs,
both buyers and sellers online should be able to offer standard and
automated contract terms with the full expectation that a court would
enforce their terms. By way of contrast, the current system permits
corporations to contract by computer and requires consumers to
contract by hand. The current system permits corporations to “read”
contracts by machine, but requires consumers to read contracts in
person. The imbalance in transaction costs is colossal. Currently
consumers must read thousands of different agreements to even begin
protecting their privacy online. None do, and it is no wonder; the law
has predetermined their failure. Information costs would be far lower
if a consumer could express her preferences once and expect that
corporations would respect those preferences. Information costs would
be lower for corporations too, who would merely have to check the
consumer’s browser handshake protocol to see if the consumer had
expressed a preference not to be tracked.
Corporate advocates are wrong when they claim that
consumer-offered contract terms would raise information costs for
corporations. The entire system at the moment revolves around
consumers shouldering massive information costs. Corporations do
not want to identify or respect their customers’ privacy preferences;
they instead intend to continue taking, aggregating, and reselling
private consumer information. Corporations continue this behavior
based on the theory that the consumer has “consented” to sale of her
personal information, even though the corporation has been clearly
and cleanly informed upon every instance of being contacted by the
consumer that this consent is withheld.
This false consent model cannot be the future of online
contracting. Among other things, consumers are becoming producers.
This is the result of the Web 2.0 model combined with so-called
283.
See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 66, at 440-41.
284.
See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy
(What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 76 (“The problems with P3P have now
been widely reported. Technical experts have noted that the protocols are complex, difficult to
implement, and unlikely to enable consumer to protect privacy. . . . Industry analysts have also
found shortcomings in the P3P proposal.” (footnote omitted)).

598

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:3:545

“prosumer” electronic equipment, which permits consumers to create
professional grade products.285 Consumers are already wearing two
hats—consumer and professional. They are clearly able to draft, offer,
and enforce contractual terms in their professional capacity. The
current trend of denying consumers the right to offer contract terms in
their consumer capacity simply cannot continue.
Another challenge to this Article’s hypothesis is that some have
already unsuccessfully attempted consumer-choice privacy models.286
A discussion of prior efforts toward consumer privacy choice, notably
the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), can explain how the
proposed solution is significantly different from those prior efforts.
The P3P, a consumer privacy system developed by the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C), attempted to simplify the interaction
between websites and consumers by automating the consumer’s
“review” of a given site’s privacy policy.287 Websites could, if they
wished, fill out a multiple-choice survey about their privacy policy,
which was translated into a privacy policy that the consumer’s web
browser would read.288 Provided they had P3P-enabled browsers,
users then indicated their privacy preference, which was translated
and compared with sites’ privacy policies.289
Despite being
implemented in Internet Explorer 6 and Netscape 7,290 P3P
experienced very limited success even by those who worked vigorously
to promote it.291

285.
See, e.g., Thomas K. Grose, 3D Comes To Web 2.0, TIME, May 13, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1739765,00.html (French company Dassault
Systèmes decided to put its high-quality modeling software into the hands of consumers . . . to
‘democratize’ its use . . . 3DVIA recently linked up with Facebook, where users can now make a
3D mashup.”).
286.
Id.
287.
See Kim Rose Goldberg, Note, Platform for Privacy Preferences (“P3P”): Finding
Consumer Assent to Electronic Privacy Policies, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
255, 263 (2003) (“While the consumer merely selects his or her privacy settings, the P3P useragent actually conducts the comparison between those settings and the P3P privacy policy.”).
288.
Id. at 260 (“Once the Web site provides its responses to the survey, those responses
are then translated into a P3P privacy policy and placed on one of the Web site's servers where it
is easily accessible by P3P user-agents.”).
289.
Id. at 261 (“When a consumer visits a P3P-enabled Web site, the second P3P
component, called a P3P user-agent, accesses the P3P privacy policy, and compares the
data-collection practices stated in that P3P privacy policy to the consumer’s privacy settings.”).
290.
See Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, W3C, http://www.w3.org/P3P/
implementations.html (last updated May 28, 2007) (listing software implementing P3P).
291.
See generally Ari Schwartz, Looking Back at P3P: Lessons for the Future, CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.cdt.org/paper/looking-back-p3p-lessonsfuture.
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One of the fatal flaws in P3P was its insufficiency as a
stand-alone system for privacy protection.292 The lack of mandatory
enforcement—any legal backing for the preferences expressed in
P3P—led to P3P’s non-adoption and demise.293 It is precisely for this
reason that courts should enforce do-not-track as a contract term
while the FTC works out whether or not it will formulate a rule.
P3P’s complexity also contributed to its lack of adoption. P3P
replicated the complexity of a corporate privacy policy on the
consumer side. The consumer had to deal with a “dashboard”
interface that presented multiple confusing options.294
The
infamously byzantine Facebook privacy controls are a modern
example—controls clearly built to create serious transaction costs for
privacy,295 induce choice paralysis, and cause consumers to abandon
their attempts to control private information. The complexity of
approaches like P3P impacted corporations as well. As a result of
complexity on the consumer side, there were too many options for
webmasters, which ultimately made implementation less appealing.296
An automated system for protecting privacy would need to address
these issues of complexity and voluntary implementation.297
Do-not-track
expresses
a
single,
unitary,
clear,
machine-readable option that communicates at every instance of the
user’s contact with a corporation that she does not consent to her
information being tracked. This is a distinction with a difference. The
entire framework of online tracking is built on consent.298 None of it
makes sense if corporations ignore the clear and oft-repeated
statement that a consumer does not give consent to tracking. Any
effort to return control over private information to consumers must, in
the first instance, take the form of an enforceable right to complete
prohibition.

292.
See William McGeveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web
Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1854 (2001) (concluding that lawmakers should use P3P as
the foundation of a privacy-protection regime, but that P3P itself is not enough to guarantee
privacy).
293.
See Schwartz, supra note 291.
294.
See Rotenberg, supra note 284.
295.
See Fowler, supra note 113 (‘“Facebook’s complex ecosystem—with thousands of
independent apps and complex data flows to and from apps—is a problem of its own creation,’
said Ben Edelman, an assistant professor at Harvard Business School.”).
296.
See Schwartz, supra note 291.
297.
Id.
298.
See Kende, supra note 101 (“The Internet is not a monolithic, uniform network;
rather, it is a network of networks . . . . In order to provide end users with universal connectivity,
Internet backbones must interconnect . . . agreements between Internet backbone providers are
reached through commercial negotiations in a ‘handshake’ environment.”); see also Feigin, supra
note 213.
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Industry advocates claim that consumers want more “nuanced”
privacy settings.299 This is quite wrong: consumers want simple,
strong, and enforceable privacy settings.300
The argument for
“nuanced” consumer privacy settings is doublespeak for creating
privacy settings complicated enough to induce choice paralysis, which
is profitable to corporations. But even if one assumes that consumers
want nuanced and complicated privacy settings, the analysis of this
Article does not change. A nuanced privacy setting is not enforceable
if a simple one is not. If consumers cannot say, simply, “I do not
consent to any tracking in any form under any circumstances” and
expect courts to enforce that statement, then we cannot begin to
consider the enforcement or utility of more complicated statements of
consumer preference.301
Courts must first enforce consumers’ clearly, simply, and
continuously communicated preferences of an absolute right to be let
alone. Complex, nuanced statements of privacy preferences may only
be considered once courts have established this basic right. This
Author’s sense is that consumers will never need that second step.
Consumers will not seek these theoretically desirable nuanced or
complicated privacy arrangements once courts enforce a simple,
continuous, and clear expression not to be tracked, not least because
consumers rightly distrust complicated privacy arrangements.302
Corporations have so abused consumer trust in the information
market that rejecting nuanced privacy arrangements seems both
easily predictable and amply justified.
299.
See Angwin & Fowler, supra note 113; cf. Many Consumers Would Allow Online
Tracking by Retailers and Service Providers if Discounts Applied, KPMG Survey Finds, PR
NEWSWIRE (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/many-consumers-wouldallow-online-tracking-by-retailers-and-service-providers-if-discounts-applied-kpmg-survey-finds135258183.html (“Some security reservations and usage preferences exist, but the increased
adoption of digital business models provides a compelling argument for retailers, content
providers and advertisers to conquer the digital divide. . . . In looking at mobile phones, only 28
percent said they would be willing to receive such advertising for a lower fee.”)
300.
See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 2, at 1815 n.1 (discussing the increase of US
Internet users and how they are ready to limit online tracking for ads).
301.
See Jonathan Feldman, Carrier IQ: Mobile App Crap Must Stop, INFO. WK. (Dec. 1,
2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/mobile/232200532 (“The Carrier
IQ situation is an insane breach of trust for enterprises. And unless phone makers copy the
Apple model, where carriers can’t pre-install app crap, it will happen again. . . . The whole model
needs to change, or this incident will be repeated. Carriers currently control the phone, and work
with third parties to build management software that they need. The third parties have no skin
in the game in terms of the trust relationship with the enterprise. . . . Now contrast that to the
simpler Apple model, where Apple delivers a phone with fundamental firmware, absent the app
crap. Both Apple and the carriers have major skin in the game to preserve the trust of the
enterprise. If carriers want to have management capabilities on the iPhone, they’ll have to
EXPLICITLY have permission from the enterprise.”)
302.
See Coase and Transaction Costs, supra note 120.
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In assessing do-not-track’s feasibility, P3P’s failure serves as a
useful blueprint going forward.303 Do-not-track as contract addresses
P3P’s main limitations in two key ways. First, do-not-track is
incredibly simple: there is only one option to select and follow.
Second, do-not-track is enforceable under the law of contract in its
own right, and may draw regulatory support from the FTC.304
Conversely, corporate resistance to do-not-track rings hollow.305
Corporate protestations lack credibility given the transaction costs
and lack of notice currently imposed on consumers.306 A corporation
has the power to refuse the connection if the proffered terms are too
complex or are not offered in machine-readable format. If terms
beyond do-not-track are expressed in a consumer’s automated contract
with an online service provider, the service provider is free to
terminate the connection. Corporations have successfully used this
argument against their customers.307 They should be held to their
own standard.

303.
But see FTC Significant Steps, supra note 4 (“FTC Commissioner Julie Brill spoke
at the Online Trust Alliance (OTA) Forum today and noted . . . . ‘I don’t see this as a toggle
switch-on or off,’ but rather ‘a place where consumers can choose through a dashboard
mechanism what they want . . . .’ She further stated that the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
Tracking Protection Working Group is working around issues like ‘what does tracking mean’ and
other technical issues.” (emphasis added)).
304.
See supra Part III.A (discussing FTC backing of a do-not-track option).
305.
See also discussion supra note 233.
306.
See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1307, 1315-19 (2005) (“Electronic contracting stretches contract doctrine even further. . . .
Today . . . courts apply the objective theory of contracts to terms delivered electronically without
considering the differences between paper and electronic communications. . . . [I]t is difficult to
find in their reported decisions a coherent framework for analyzing electronic agreements.”); see
also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 3, 4 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed.,
2007) (“The existence of a one-sided contract does not imply that the transaction will be
one-sided but only that the seller will have discretion with respect to how to treat the consumer.”
(second emphasis added)); Coase and Transaction Costs, supra note 120; Consumer Protection,
supra note 120.
307.
See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“Clicking on the notice links the user to a separate web page containing the full text of the
license agreement, which allegedly binds any user of the information on the site. However, the
user is not required to click on an icon expressing assent to the license, or even view its terms,
before proceeding to use the information on the site.”); see also Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F.
Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (D. Haw. 2010) (“The Court finds the agreement here valid. Plaintiff had
notice of the User Agreement, was required to affirmatively agree to it by clicking “I agree,” and
had an opportunity to cease playing Lineage II if he disagreed with it.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article advances a simple hypothesis: consumers should
be able to effectively offer their own enforceable terms in online
contracts. There is no reasoned ground in contract law or the
economic weighing of transaction costs to prohibit consumers from
doing so. Further, consumer-proffered automated contracts offer a
potential solution to several long-standing and troubling conundrums
in online contract law as it has drifted from its traditional
common-law moorings.
The problem of online contracting is one of information
poisoning: there is too much information. This is true for privacy
policies, EULAs, and TOSs. Corporate-drafted contracts may look like
the contracts that courts are accustomed to enforcing, but they are
written in legalese that consumers are unlikely to understand.
Further, enforcing corporate terms in individual consumer cases does
not simplify analysis across cases. Each corporate privacy policy may
seem simple, well drafted, and therefore the best document for a court
to enforce. But each policy is different, and the number of online
corporate privacy policies, EULAs, and TOSs is high.
To the extent that courts have tried to address the problem of
online contracting, they have attempted to reinsert humans into the
contracting equation by insisting that consumers read an ever-greater
number of ever-longer contracts. Even courts that have identified
information costs as the problem have determined, incorrectly, that
the solution is more information.
The problem of too much
information cannot be solved by more information.
The answer is not more humans in electronic contracting, but
more computers. Rather than resolving these enduring questions of
consumer contracts by reemphasizing the human element of
contracting, this Article proposes to permit consumers to offer
enforceable contract terms via automated processes. Consumers
should be able to set machine-readable contract terms in precisely the
same manner that corporations do now. The law as it stands is deeply
imbalanced because only corporations can conduct their contracting in
an automated manner. Consumer-side automated contracting would
put the power to determine contract terms—and thus privacy—back
in individuals’ hands.

